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Abstract
My dissertation is a collection of three essays that consider various aspects of income
inequality and the demand for skill.
The first chapter uses the advent of the US Interstate Highway System to examine the effect
of reducing trade barriers on the relative demand for skilled labor. The Interstate Highway
System was designed to connect major cities, to serve national defense, and to connect the
US to Canada and Mexico. As an unintended consequence, many rural counties were
connected to the highway system. I find that these counties experienced an increase in trade-
related activities, such as trucking and retail sales. By increasing trade, the highways raised
the relative demand for skilled manufacturing workers in skill-abundant counties and reduced
it elsewhere, consistent with the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model.
The second chapter examines the effect of the division of labor on the demand for
information processing. I find that manufacturing industries with a more complex division of
labor employ relatively more clerks, who process information that is used to coordinate
production. An early information technology (IT) revolution that took place around 1900
raised the relative demand for clerks in manufacturing, and significantly more so in industries
with a complex division of labor. The increased demand for clerks likely contributed to the
subsequent onset of the High School Movement. Interestingly, recent changes in IT have
enabled firms to substitute computers for clerks, and I find evidence that this substitution
occurred at a faster rate in more complex industries.
The third chapter, coauthored with Liz Ananat, examines the effect of marital breakup on the
economic outcomes of women with children. We find that having a female firstborn child
increases the probability that a woman's first marriage ends in divorce. Using this exogenous
variation we find that divorce has little effect on a woman's average household income, but it
does increase the probability that her household ends up in the lowest income quartile. While
women partially offset the loss of spousal earnings by receiving more child support and
welfare, combining households, and increasing their labor supply, divorce still increases the
odds of household poverty.
Thesis Supervisor: Daron Acemoglu
Title: Charles P. Kindleberger Professor of Applied Economics
Thesis Supervisor: Joshua Angrist
Title: Professor of Economics
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Chapter 1
The Effect of Trade on the Demand for Skill -
Evidence from the Interstate Highway System
1.1 Introduction
The effect of reducing global trade barriers on inequality has been the subject of intense
debate (Freeman 2004). The Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) framework emphasizes the role of factor
endowment differences as determinants of trade patterns. In a two-factor H-O model with
two economies, the removal of trade barriers favors high-skilled workers in the skill-abundant
developed world and low-skilled workers in the less developed world. But recent empirical
and theoretical work challenges the applicability of the H-O framework for the analysis of
the labor market consequences of trade. 1
The principal empirical challenge in assessing the general-equilibrium effect of interna-
tional trade on labor demand is identification. Recent work estimates the effects of trade
liberalization (Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik 2003) and exchange rate shocks (Verhoogen
2004) on labor demand in developing countries. While these case-studies are informative,
they may be insufficient to determine the effect of removing trade barriers on the demand for
skill. First, the consequences of trade liberalization depend on the distribution of industrial
protection, while exchange rate shocks affect exporters and importers in opposite ways. Sec-
ond, governments that liberalize trade or face rapid currency devaluation may affect labor
'The H-O model cannot fully explain recent changes in worldwide labor demand (Krugman 1995; and
Berman, Bound, and Machin 1998). Against this backdrop, theoretical work suggests that reduced trade
barriers may increase the demand for skilled labor even in economies with a low skill endowment (Acemoglu
2003; Kremer and Maskin 2003; Matsuyama 2004; and Antras, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg 2005).
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markets directly. Finally, concurrent pervasive skill-biased technical change may also change
the demand for skill. Taking a different approach, Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997) use
factor-content analysis to estimate the effect of trade on wages. However, these calculations
rely on a fairly restrictive set of assumptions. To better understand the effect of trade on
the demand for skill, we require exogenous variation in trade barriers that affects a wide
range of industries and allows us to control for other concurrent changes in the labor market
equilibrium.
In this paper, I use the advent of the United States Interstate Highway System as an
interesting policy experiment to estimate the effect of reducing trade barriers on the demand
for skill. The construction of the Interstate Highway System began after funding was ap-
proved in 1956, and by 1975 the system was mostly complete, spanning over 40,000 miles.
The highways were designed to address three policy goals. First, they were intended to
improve the connection between major metropolitan areas. in the United States. Second,
they were planned to serve U.S. national defense. And finally, they were designed to con-
nect with major routes in Canada and Mexico. As a consequence - but not an objective -
many rural counties were also connected to the Interstate Highway System.2 Rural counties
crossed by the highways experienced an exogenous reduction in barriers to trade, providing
an opportunity to examine how product market integration affects relative factor demand.3
I show that large trucks used the rural Interstate Highways much more intensively than
other types of vehicles. As the highway construction was being completed, the trucking
industry grew very rapidly and trucks became the primary mode for cross-county commerce.
I find that highways increased trucking income and retail sales by about 7-10 percent per
capita in rural counties they crossed, relative to other rural counties. This suggests that
highway counties took advantage of the reduction in trade barriers to increase their trade
2 An extensive literature, dating back to Fogel (1964) examines the effects of transportation infrastructure
on growth. Of this literature, my approach is closest to Chandra and Thompson (2000), who estimate the
effects of the Interstate Highway System on growth in rural counties.
3 Horiba and Kirkpatrick (1981), Davis et al. (1997) and others use within-country variation in factor
endowments to test various predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin framework. But this literature has not
identified exogenous variations in regional factor endowments or in trade barriers.
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with other counties.
I interpret the changes in highway counties, relative to non-highway counties, as the
mean effect of reduced trade barriers. In order to test the predictions of the two factor H-O
framework, I interact this variation with pre-existing differences in human capital endowment
between the rural counties, as proxied by the fraction of high school graduates among persons
25 years and older in 1950. I find that on average highways did not change the wage-bill
of (high-skilled) non-production workers relative to the wage-bill of (low-skilled) production
workers in manufacturing.4 But in rural counties that had a highly educated workforce,
highways increased the relative wage-bill of non-production workers, and where the workforce
was less educated, highways decreased the relative wage-bill of non-production workers.
These results are robust to the inclusion of time-varying controls for geographic location and
land abundance. This finding is consistent with the H-O prediction that trade increases the
demand for skill where it is relatively abundant and decreases it elsewhere.
Using my estimates I calculate the elasticity of the wage-bill of non-production workers
relative to production workers in manufacturing with respect to the ratio of domestic trade to
local GDP. In a county that exceeds the mean level of education by one standard deviation
this elasticity is roughly equal to 1. This finding suggests that trade may contribute to
changes in labor market inequality, but its effects are not very large.5
Another prediction of the H-O model is that trade shifts employment towards industries
intensive in the relatively abundant factor. To test this prediction, I calculate a measure of
skill intensity of the manufacturing workforce in each county using data on 2-digit Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) industries. I find that highways did not significantly shift
employment to skill-intensive manufacturing industries in skill-abundant counties, nor did it
shift employment to low-skill industries where skill was scarce.
One possible interpretation of the change in the demand for skill and the absence of a
shift in the industry composition in response to reduced trade barriers is that compositional
4I focus on manufacturing due to the availability of wage and employment data.
5 However, it is possible that removing trade barriers across countries may have other effects on inequality.
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changes may have taken place within industries or product classes.6 Another possibility is
that trade may have also increased the demand for skilled workers in skill-abundant counties
through other channels.
My interpretation that highways affect county-level outcomes by removing trade barriers
faces several potential challenges. First, political agents may have changed highway routes
in response to economic or demographic conditions in rural counties, contrary to the original
planners' intent. In order to address this concern, I instrument for highway location using
the original plan of routes proposed in 1944. I also construct a second instrument, based on
the fact that an Interstate Highway is more likely to run through a rural county that lies to
the north, south, east, or west of the nearest major city. Estimates using these instrumental
variables (IV) are consistent with the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates. In addition, I
find that measures of trade and demand for skill do not differ significantly between highway
and non-highway counties before highway construction was completed. Second, my empirical
strategy assumes that counties approximate separate labor markets. This assumption is
consistent with the finding of many recent studies that wage differences vary persistently
across regional markets in the United States.7 In the sample I use, about three-quarters of
the workers are employed in their county of residence, suggesting that counties are plausible
units for the analysis of local labor markets. My results also suggest that the effect of
highways on the relative wage and relative employment of high skilled workers were the
same in sign. This finding is consistent with a change in the relative demand for skill, as we
would expect from opening to trade, so the effect on the relative wage bill is unlikely driven
purely by migration. Finally, one might argue that highways could have affected patterns
of commuting, changing the geographic skill distribution of employment. However, I find
that highways had little effect on passenger car traffic, and that the fraction of workers who
commute to work did not increase in highway counties relative to other counties.
6 Schott (2004) shows evidence of specialization within product classes in international trade.
7See for example Acemoglu, Autor and Lyle (2004); Bernard, Redding and Schott (2005); and Card and
DiNardo (2001).
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Section II describes a simple theoretical framework, which considers the effects of trade
on the relative demand for skilled workers. Section III presents a brief historical overview of
the planning and construction of the Interstate Highway System. Section IV discusses the
data and the samples I use. Section V discusses the effects of highways on trade. Section VI
estimates the effect of highways on the relative demand for skilled workers, and Section VII
reports estimates of their effect on the industrial composition of employment. Section VIII
presents conclusions.
1.2 Theoretical Framework
To frame the key questions of this investigation, it is useful to first discuss the theoretical
implications of reducing trade barriers for the wage distribution. The model I use is an
extension of the Heckscher-Ohlin framework with a continuum of goods as in Dornbusch,
Fischer, and Samuelson (1980). The model assumes that differences in factor endowments
determine the patterns and consequences of trade. The analysis begins with a single closed
economy, and then considers two economies that differ only in their endowments and trade
with each other. The model predicts that trade increases demand for the relatively abundant
factor and shifts employment towards industries intensive in that factor. These predictions
persist even when factor prices are not equalized and when migration between the economies
is possible.
Consider an economy with two factors of production: a continuum H of high-skilled
workers and a continuum L of low-skilled workers. There is a continuum of goods z on the
interval [0, 1]. The production function for each good is
Q(z) = F. (H(z), L(z)), (1)
where H(z) and L(z) are the employment of high- and low-skilled labor in industry z.
I assume that the production functions are twice continuously differentiable, increase in
each of the arguments (with diminishing marginal returns), and satisfy constant returns to
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scale and the Inada conditions. The goods are ranked in a strictly decreasing order of skill
intensity in production and there are no factor intensity reversals.8 I assume that all factor
and product markets are perfectly competitive with profit-maximizing firms and free entry.
Each consumer is endowed with one unit of labor of her type. Consumers are assumed
to have an identical Cobb-Douglas utility function:
U = b(Z) n d(z)dz, (2)
where d(z) is the quantity of good z consumed, and
J b(z)dz = 1. (3)
The model thus assumes that income effects and differences in preferences play no role in
determining the patterns of trade.
1.2.1 Closed Economy Equilibrium
I examine the existence and properties of a closed economy equilibrium, which is charac-
terized by individual optimization, producer optimization and market-clearing. First, indi-
viduals maximize their utility subject to their budget constraint, so they spend a constant
fraction b(z) of their income on each good z at all prices and all levels of income.
Second, firms are competitive, so they maximize their profits
IT(Z) = P(z)Q(z) - WHH(Z) - WLL(z), (4)
where WH and WL are the wage rates for high- and low-skilled workers, and P(z) is the price
8In other words, I assume that the ranking of industries in terms of their relative skill intensity is invariant
to factor prices.
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of good z. Free entry implies a zero profit condition:
P(z)Q(z) = WHH(z) + wLL(z). (5)
Finally, the equality of supply and demand for every good implies:
P(z)Q(z) = b(z) (WHH + WLL) . (6)
Combining the last two expressions we get:
x(z) - L(z)L = b(z)(1 + wh) (7)
1 + wh(w; z)' (7)
where x(z) the intensity of low-skilled labor in industry z relative to the economy as a whole,
w = wH/WL is the skill premium. The ratio of low- to high-skilled workers employed in the
entire economy and in the production of good z are h = HIL and h(w; z) = H(w; z)/L(w; z).
The market-clearing conditions for low- and high-skill labor are
x(z)dz = 1 and xJ (z)h(w;z)dz = h. (8)
0 0
Combining these expressions we get an equilibrium condition for the closed economy as
a whole:
n(w; h) b(z)(1 + wh) [h(w; z) - h] dz = 0. (9)
o 1 + wh(w; z)
Since the production functions satisfy the Inada conditions, there are low values of w
such that h(w; z) is higher than h for all z and hence O(w; h) is positive at those values of
w; similarly, there high values of w for which O(w; h) is negative. Because the production
functions are assumed to be neoclassical, () is continuous in w. Thus there exists an
equilibrium level of skill premium in autarky, w = wA.
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Next we note that (w; h) is strictly decreasing in w:
a(w; h) < 0, (10)
aw
so the equilibrium skill premium is unique. The leftmost curve in Figure 1 shows the existence
and uniqueness of the equilibrium skill premium in the closed home economy. Given the
equilibrium skill premium, wA, relative price structure and the supply and demand of each
good are uniquely determined.
Predictably, an increase in the skill endowment of the economy reduces the skill premium:
_o(w; h) (wA .9(w;h)] (11)
ah o=h [ aw 
1.2.2 Open Economy Equilibrium
Consider opening the economy to trade with another such economy, which differs only in
its factor endowments. The foreign economy has a high-skilled labor force of size H* and a
low-skilled labor force of size L*. The foreign economy is assumed to have a lower fraction of
skilled workers: h* _ H*/L* < h. Figure 1 demonstrates that the equilibrium skill premium
in the foreign economy, wA*, is higher than the skill premium in the home economy, as shown
in (11).
First I analyze the equilibrium where the fraction of skilled workers does not differ greatly
between the two economies, so trade equalizes factor prices (of course, if the fraction is
identical trade has no effect). Appendix A shows that the equilibrium skill premium with
trade and factor price equalization, WTpE, is characterized by the equation:
q(WFpE; h) = 0, (12)
where h is the ratio of the stock of high-skilled workers to low-skilled workers in the
two economies together, and h* < h < h. Using (11) we conclude that the skill premium
16
increases in the home economy (which has a high skill endowment) and decreases in the
foreign economy (see Figure 1). Moreover, the effect of opening to trade on the skill premium
increases with the difference in relative factor endowments. Since factor supply is assumed
constant, the relative wage bill of skilled workers in the home economy, S wh, increases
with trade. In the foreign economy, where skill is scarce, trade decreases the relative wage
bill of skilled workers.
Because preferences for consumption goods are homothetic and identical, the skill compo-
sition of goods consumed in both economies is equal. The home economy employs more skill
in production, so it must be a net exporter of skill. When trade equalizes factor prices all
commodities can be produced at equal costs in both economies. The exact pattern of produc-
tion (and trade) is thus indeterminate, except in one important respect: the skill-abundant
economy will, on average, export skill-intensive goods. When trade leads to complete special-
ization, the pattern of trade is precisely determined, so the skill-abundant economy is also a
net exporter of skill. We therefore conclude that opening to trade shifts production towards
skill-intensive goods in the skill-abundant economy; the opposite is true for the skill-scarce
economy.
Next consider the case where endowments differ sufficiently to give rise to complete
specialization without equalizing factor prices in the two economies. Suppose that the home
economy has a comparative advantage in producing a given good; then it has an advantage
in producing all goods that are more skill-intensive. Thus, when the two economies trade,
the home economy specializes in producing skill-intensive goods, while the foreign economy
specializes in producing goods that are less skill-intensive. The threshold commodity, T, is
determined in equilibrium, such that its cost of production is equal in both economies:
P (T) = P () = wLa () + wHc () = wLa* (z) + wHc* (),v (13)
where producing one unit of commodity z requires a(z) units of low-skilled labor and c(z)
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units of high-skilled labor. Since the skill premium in the home economy is lower (w < w*),
the threshold commodity is produced with a higher skill intensity in the home economy. The
home economy produces the goods in the range [0, z] and imports goods in the range [z, 1].
The total income in the home economy is WLL + WHH and a fraction 9 - b(z)dz of this
0
income is spent on imported goods. The condition of balanced trade is therefore
(WLL + WHH) 0 = (wL* + w*H*) (1 - 0). (14)
The equilibrium conditions in the markets for low- and high-skilled labor in the home
economy are
L=- f a(z)b(z) [(WLL + wHH) + (w*L* + w*H*)]
Jo P(z)
H= JZ c(z)b(z) [(wLL + HH) + (wLL + wHH)] d. (15)
o P(z)
Combining these results with the balanced trade equation we get
o b(z)(1 + wh) [h(w; z) - h] dz = 0. (16)
Jo 1 + wh(w; z)
The unique equilibrium is characterized by the wage ratio in the home economy, w = wT.9
Skill intensity declines in z, so h(w; z) < h for all z > i. We therefore conclude that
I b(z)(wT + wTh)
O(wT; h) = o T +) [h(w; z) - h dz < 0. (17)
o WT + WTh(WT; Z)
Comparing this result with the closed economy equilibrium and using the fact that q
is decreasing in the skill premium, we conclude that wT > wA. Hence opening to trade
9 There is a unique equilibrium skill premium because the competitive equilibrium maximizes total output
with respect to (L, H, L*, H*), subject to the two resource constraints for each economy. The four endoge-
nously determined variables are the the skill premia in the two economies (wT, wT*), the ratio of skilled
wages in the two economies (WH/W*), and the threshold commodity (). The problem is convex, and hence
there is a unique solution.
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increases the skill premium in the home economy. A similar calculation for the foreign
economy indicates that it, too, has a unique skill premium, wT*, and that wT* < wA*. In
other words, when the foreign economy opens to trade the skill premium in this economy
declines.
Since factor endowments are assumed constant in this case, trade increases the relative
wage bill of the locally abundant factor. In addition, since trade leads to specialization, each
economy clearly shifts production towards goods intensive in the locally abundant factor in
response to opening to trade.
1.2.3 The Effect of Trade on the Demand for Skill
The qualitative effects of opening to trade on labor markets are similar regardless of whether
factor prices are equalized. First, trade increases the demand for the abundant factor. When
trade becomes possible the wage-bill share of skilled workers in the skill-abundant economy
increase relative to that of less-skilled workers. The opposite is true for an economy with a low
endowment of skill. Second, trade shifts the composition of employment towards industries
intensive in the relatively abundant factor. These predictions persist in the borderline case
with complete specialization and factor price equalization.
The two predictions outlined above are robust to allowing free migration of workers
between the two economies (see Appendix B). Suppose each economy has a fixed supply of
housing and people spend a constant fraction of their income on housing. Assume that, all
else equal, skilled workers prefer to live in the home economy.10 If migration is possible but
trade is too costly, the home economy is more skill-abundant, and therefore has a lower skill
premium and higher price of housing. Opening to trade increases the demand for skilled
labor in the home economy, raising the relative wage-bill share of skilled workers through
inflows of high-skilled workers and outflows of low-skilled workers.
10If workers do not prefer either economy and migration is costless then the skill endowments of both
economies are identical (assuming both are populated). The assumption of different preferences yields
differences in endowment and motivates trade.
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The model presented here may be extended to include capital, and its predictions hold as
long as free flow of capital equalizes the interest rate. Including land as a factor of production
can change the model's predictions, so in the following sections I test whether controlling for
differences in land abundance affects the outcomes of interest.1 '
To examine the implications of the H-O framework for the relationship between an ex-
ogenous reduction in trade barriers and relative wages, consider two potential trading blocs.
Each bloc consists of two economies, one of which is more skill-abundant. To make the link
with the empirical work in the next section, I now propose to think of the economies in
each trading bloc as counties. Initially, the counties in each bloc are autarkic, and relative
wages are determined by local supply and demand. Highways are then constructed between
the economies of one bloc, allowing them to trade. First, highways increase trade flows be-
tween those counties; trade flows equalize commodity prices, though not necessarily factor
prices. Second, the trade flows increase the wage-bill of high-skilled workers relative to low-
skilled workers where skill is relatively abundant, and decrease it elsewhere. Finally, trade
shifts the composition of employment in skill-abundant counties towards more skill-intensive
industries, and vice versa in counties where skill is scarce.
1.3 History of the Interstate Highway System
The Interstate Highway System provides a natural experiment that I envision as inducing
an exogenous reduction in trade barriers. During the first half of the 20th century much
of the economic activity in the United States was highly localized, as distances were long
and transcontinental travel was slow. Lewis (1997) describes President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt's early interest in constructing a national network of highways to reduce travel
"lTrade may also affect the demand for skill in other ways. For example, technology embodied in goods
that are traded may affect firms production possibilities. Matsuyama (2004) argues that exporting firms are
more skill-intensive, so reducing trade barriers could favor skilled workers everywhere. If a similar argument
applies in the domestic U.S. setting, trade may increase the demand for skilled workers even where skill is
scarce. A similar result may occur if the assumption of identical and homothetic preferences is violated.
For example, Leonardi (2003) argues that wealthier and more educated workers tend to consume more
skill-intensive goods, so if trade increases income it could favor skilled workers.
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time:
Given his interest in road building, it is little wonder that early in 1937
[President] Roosevelt called Thomas MacDonald, chief of the Bureau of Public
Roads, to the White House. On a map of the United States, the president had
drawn three lines north and south and three lines east and west. These would
be the routes for a new transcontinental system of interstate toll highways, he
explained.
This grid pattern persisted in all the subsequent modifications of the highway plan; the
next section describes how I use it to construct an instrument for the highway system.
The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944 laid out a plan for a system of highways designed
"To connect by routes as direct as practicable the principal metropolitan areas, cities and
industrial centers, to serve the national defense and to connect suitable border points with
routes of continental importance in the Dominion of Canada and the Republic of Mexico."12
Although rural areas were not considered by the planners, highways were designed to cross
many rural counties as an unintended consequence of meeting these policy goals.
The construction of the Interstate Highway System began following the approval of the
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, which also changed planned routes of the highways.l3
The legislation stipulated that access to the highways be free, except for a few existing toll
highways incorporated into the Interstate Highway System. The federal government bore
90 percent of the cost of construction, while the states financed the remaining 10 percent.
Figure 3 shows that in 1966 the highways were still mostly disconnected-thick lines show
constructed sections, while thin lines show planned sections. By 1975, however, almost all
the sections had been completed (see Figure 4).
'
2 Public Roads Administration press release (1947). Figure 2 shows the layout of the plan.
l3In subsequent years further changes were made to the design of the system, but they were relatively
minor.
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1.4 Data and Samples
I use a number of data sources to construct the sample of Interstate Highways. First, the
National Transportation Atlas Databases (2002) identifies the exact routes of the highways.
Second, I use historical data to restrict the sample to highways that were mostly constructed
from 1959-1975. I exclude state-interstate highway cells for which the 1975 mileage was less
than 80 percent of the 2002 mileage.l4 Using maps issued by the Bureau of Public Roads
and the Federal Highway Administration, I exclude state-interstate highway cells where the
1959 mileage exceeded 20 percent of the 1975 mileage. This selection criterion excludes toll
highways, which were constructed before 1959 and later incorporated into the Interstate
Highway System. Third, I restrict the sample to longer highways, which more likely connect
distant locations (as envisioned by the early planners), and are therefore less affected by
local economic conditions. I therefore exclude all 3-digit highways, which serve metropolitan
areas, and restrict the sample to highways whose total remaining length exceeds 500 miles.
This leaves most segments of 18 highways, half of which run primarily north and south and
half of which run primarily east and west. Together these segments extend over more than
24,000 miles, more than half of the total length of the Interstate Highway System.
The Interstate Highways were constructed in all 48 contiguous states, but they only
crossed some counties, affording substantial within-state variation. Counties are a meaning-
ful geographic unit for the analysis of labor markets, since from 1970-1990 only about 20-30
percent of workers in rural counties commuted to work outside their county of residence.
Publicly available micro data do not identify individuals' county of residence, so I use aggre-
gate county-level data from County and City Data Books, County Business Patterns, Bureau
of Economic Analysis Regional Economic Accounts, and the National Transportation Atlas
Database. I limit the sample to counties whose population in 1950 was more than 50 percent
rural and whose land area changed by no more than 5 percent from 1950-1980. I also exclude
l4To determine the length of each highway in December 1975 in every state, I use the Interstate Gap Study
(1976); this study is a report to Congress by the Department of Transportation.
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counties that had one or more highway segments running through them, but no segment was
constructed between 1959-1975.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the sample of counties. Sample counties were
predominantly rural in 1950, so they were more sparsely populated and somewhat poorer
than non-sample counties. About three-quarters of the mileage was planned for construction
on new right-of-way, most likely due to the high cost of land adjacent to existing highways.
This suggests that highway counties may have been negatively selected compared to non-
highway counties. But Table 1 shows that highway counties were somewhat richer and
experienced faster population growth even before the construction of the highways. These
differential rates of population growth motivate an analysis that compares counties in per
capita terms and examines the possibility of pre-existing trends in key variables.
Although the Interstate Highways were not intended to serve rural counties, their routes
may have been changed by political considerations correlated with the economic conditions
that prevailed after World War II. I therefore use an indicator for having a highway planned
in 1944 (zlc) as an instrument for the location of the interstate highway system.5
I use the geographic variation in the allocation of highways to counties to generate a
second instrument. Figure 5 shows a key feature of the Interstate Highway System, dating
back to President Roosevelt: routes are mostly along lines of latitude and longitude. Since
highways were also planned to connect cities, I calculate the orientation of the nearest large
city with respect to each county's geographic centroid:16
A (2) arcsin -yc) /) + ( -yc) , (18)
(7r/2) Vkxc
where (xc, y,) and (c, y&) are the coordinates of the county centroid and the nearest city.
15In concurrent and independent research, Baum-Snow (2004) looks at the effect of highways on population
growth in suburban areas. He uses a 1947 map of the Interstate Highway System to construct an instrument
for the routes of highways in metropolitan areas. Lahr et al. (2005) also examine the effect of highways on
the size of metropolitan areas.
16 The sample of cities is constructed using 1950 population data. It includes the most populous city in each
state and any city that had at least 100,000 persons. The resulting sample includes 119 cities. I calculated
the geographic centroid of each county using the Geographic Information System.
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I use this measure to construct an instrument for the probability that a county received a
highway: Z2 = 45-IA.II
Figure 6 plots a kernel regression of the probability that a highway crosses a county as
a function of the orientation. If you live in a rural county and the nearest major city is to
your north, east, or west, the odds of having an interstate run through your county are much
better than if the city's orientation if off one of the major axes.
To test if the two instruments affect the probability that a highway crosses a county, I
estimate the following cross-section regressions of the form:
he = azC + i3xc + E, (19)
where h is an indicator for a segment of the Interstate Highway System crossing county
c, Zc includes either (or both) instruments Z1c, Z2c, and ec is a residual. The county level
controls, xc, vary across specifications, and include region fixed effects and the distance from
the county centroid to the nearest city. Table 2 shows that the instrument based on the
1944 plan is a very strong predictor of the routes along which highways were eventually
constructed. The instrument based on the direction to the nearest city also has substantial
predictive power for the location of highways.17
1.5 The Effect of Highways on Trade
In this section I estimate the effect of the Interstate Highway System on domestic trade.
By allowing traffic to flow more rapidly, the highways reduced barriers to domestic trade,
facilitating cross-county commerce. Since I have no data on county level imports and exports
to the rest of the nation, I measure correlates of domestic commerce - trucking and retail sales.
I find that trucks used rural highways very intensively, and aggregate data suggests that the
17I later use the instruments to test if outcomes change differentially over time for highway and non-
highway counties. For that purpose I interact each instrument with a dummy for post-1975, and use this
interaction term to instrument for the interaction of the highway dummy with post-1975. The first stage for
the interacted regression is essentially identical to the results in Table 2.
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Interstate Highway System contributed to the growth of the trucking industry. Next, I show
that highway counties experienced a large increase in trucking and retail sales relative to
other counties after the Interstate Highway System was completed. While highways appear
to have affected trade, I show that cross-county commuting did not change differentially for
highway counties relative to other counties. Finally, I discuss the implications of highways
for the equalization of prices and wages.
The Interstate Highway System consists almost entirely of four-lane, divided highways
with controlled and limited access. As such, it allows vehicles to travel more safely and
at higher speeds in rural areas. Data from 1982-1991 suggests that the average speed of
vehicles on rural Interstate Highways was at least 6-9 percent higher than the average speed
on other rural principal and minor arterials and 10-15 percent higher than the average speed
on rural major collectors.ls In addition, rural Interstate Highways allow traffic to bypass
small urban areas, allowing even larger time gains. Since the late 1970s, rural Interstate
Highways have carried about 8 percent of the total passenger car traffic and 11 percent of
single-unit truck traffic in the U.S. In contrast, rural Interstate Highways have borne over 30
percent of the total traffic of combination trucks, which are typically designed to transport
large volumes over long distances (Table 3).19 In fact, in the past couple of decades trucks
account for almost one-fifth of the traffic on rural Interstate Highways. It thus appears that
the Interstate Highway System has proved very important for the trucking industry.
During the 1970s, as the Interstate Highway System opened for traffic, the use of com-
bination trucks expanded much more rapidly than in previous or subsequent decades (see
Figure 7).20 In 1969, the ratio of earnings in the trucking and warehousing industry over
earnings in the railroad industry was about 1.7; by 1997 this ratio increased to almost 4.8
(Regional Economic Accounts 2004). By then trucks transported more than 71 percent of
'"The data are from the National Transportation Statistics 1993, Table 13.
19A combination truck consists of a truck tractor and at least one trailer unit.
2 0Federal regulations that govern the weight and dimensions of trucks and other motor vehicles were first
enacted in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956. They were subsequently revised in 1975 and 1983 (U.S.
House of Representatives, 2002). It is therefore highly unlikely that the increased use of combination trucks
in the first half of the 1970's was caused by such regulation.
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the value of domestic trade in the United States.21 Thus, the aggregate evidence suggests
that the Interstate Highway System facilitated domestic trade by allowing a more extensive
use of trucks.
My interpretation of the effect of the Interstate Highway System on economic outcomes
assumes that they reduced barriers to trade across counties. In 1997 most of the domestic
trade in the U.S. - about 58 percent - was conducted across state borders; this is clearly a
very low bound on cross-county trade. In fact, almost two-thirds of the value of commodities
transported by truck were shipped for at least 50 miles and therefore, most likely, across
county borders.22 These figures are consistent with the view that the highways are important
for cross-county trade.
The evidence presented thus far pertains to aggregate trends, but we can also examine
the effect of highways on rural counties they crossed, relative to other rural counties. I have
no county-level measure of real trucking activity, such as miles traveled or value of goods
transported. The Bureau of Economic Analysis does, however, provide county-level data on
earnings in the trucking and warehousing industry. I use this data to estimate specifications
of the form:
T = 0C + Pt + ath + Ed, (20)
where Tt is log earnings in the trucking and warehousing industries per capita in county c
at time t; bc, and Pt are county fixed effects and year effects; at is a time-varying coefficient
on the indicator for highway counties, h; and ed is a residual. Recall from Table 1 that
highway counties are on average closer to large cities. To check that the estimates are not
driven by differential trends for counties with different locations or land-abundance, some
specifications control for time-varying effects of region, distance from the county centroid to
the nearest city, and 1950 population density.
2lCommodity Flow Survey (1997). If we include commodities transported by multiple modes of trans-
portation these figures are even higher.
22If we the median county in the sample were a square, it would measure about 25 miles on a side. The
maximum linear distance to traverse within such a square is about 35 miles.
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The results (Table 4 and Figure 8) indicate that earnings in the trucking and warehousing
industry, per capita, increased in highway counties relative to non-highway counties. Most
of the increase took place during the 1970s, consistent with the timing of the construction
of the Interstate Highway System. It is possible that non-highway counties also benefitted
from the highways, although to a lesser extent. Conversely, some trucking activity may
have shifted from non-highway counties to highway counties. Thus we can only identify the
differential effect of highways on highway counties relative to non-highway counties.23
The results in Table 4 suggest that highways indeed facilitated the flow of commodities.
However, these findings do not rule out the possibility that truckers reside in highway counties
and transfer goods used in other counties. To further substantiate the hypothesis that
highways increased the flow of commerce in counties they crossed, I estimate their effect on
retail sales. Specifically, I regress log retail sales per capita on the same regressors as in (20);
similar specifications control for other covariates. The results (Table 5 and Figure 8) show
that highway counties experienced a rapid increase in retail sales relative to non-highway
counties since the 1970s. The results also indicate that highway and non-highway counties
displayed similar trends before and during the highway construction. Given that highways
also increased trucking, it appears very likely that the increase in retail sales is due to goods
"imported" from outside the county.2 4
In order to address the concern that the results may be affected by selection, I also
estimate the effect of highways on trucking and retail sales using the instrumental variables
described in the previous section. Table 6 presents estimates using specification of the form:
Ya = Ac + Pt + 3d1975 hc + ec, (21)
23The available data also does not account for trucks used by firms outside the trucking industry.
2 Highways could increase retail sales per capita for a number of reasons. First, H-O theory predicts that
trade will increase income, thereby raising average consumption (see Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson
1980). Second, if highways facilitate market integration of rural areas, sales may shift to formal establish-
ments, further raising sales of retailers. Finally, it is possible that retailers will make capital investments
complementary to the highways, further increasing their sales.
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where Ya is the outcome and d1975 is an indicator for post-1975, when the highway segments
in the sample were mostly complete. Another specification substitutes a state-level index
of highway completion for the post-1975 indicator.2 5 Finally, I also estimate this equation
using IV, where z, 1ld1 975 or Zc,2d975 serve as instruments for hcd1975.
OLS estimates suggest that highways increased retail sales per capita by 8-10 percentage
points and IV estimates using the 1944 plan give a similar result. Using the direction
instrument, rather than the 1944 plan, gives estimates that are larger and less precise. When
I limit the sample to the Midwest and South, where the first stage is larger, the IV estimates
are twice as large as the OLS estimates and marginally significant. The OLS estimates for
earnings in trucking and warehousing per capita also increased by about 8-10 percentage
points. The IV estimates are less precise, but they are similar to the OLS estimates. These
results are consistent with the view that highways affected economic outcomes by changing
the patterns of trade.
In the following analysis, I interpret the effect of highways on the labor market as a
consequence of the removal of trade barriers. One potential concern about this interpretation
is that highways may also affect patterns of commuting, thereby changing the geographic
skill distribution of employment. Figure 7, however, suggests that rural Interstate Highways
had little aggregate effect on passenger traffic. The final outcome in Table 6 is the fraction
of workers, who commute to work outside their county of residence. The results show that
commuting did not significantly increase in rural highway counties, compared to other rural
counties.
A related concern is that migration patterns may be correlated with highway location for
reasons other than a change in labor demand. My estimates suggest that highway counties
2 5The benchmark specification assumes that highways affected outcomes only after 1975, when they were
essentially complete. In order to relax this assumption, I calculate a state-level index of highway completion
using the length of rural interstate highways with four lanes and restricted access control that were open to
traffic. Since most of the interstate highways that were open to traffic in 1960 were toll roads incorporated
into the system, I exclude them from my analysis. Thus, the state-level index measures if the mileage of
highways in a given year, net of the 1960 mileage, accounts for more than 90 percent of the difference between
the 1975 mileage and the 1960 mileage.
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experienced a faster rate of population growth both before and after the highways were
constructed, with no evidence of a change in trend (results not shown). In the next section
I discuss the possibility that highways changed the relative supply of skill, rather than the
relative demand.
The theoretical framework also predicts that where costless trade is possible, commodity
prices (though not necessarily factor prices) will be equal. The Interstate Highway System
appears to have significantly reduced the cost of trade in commodities. While I have no direct
evidence on price changes in rural areas, Parsley and Wei (1996) use data from 1975-1992
and find rapid convergence of commodity prices across U.S. cities. This finding is consistent
with the theory, since all major U.S. cities are connected to the Interstate Highway System.
Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2005) find that wage differences persist across geographically
disparate labor markets in the U.S.; this suggests that factor endowment differences may
have prevented factor price equalization.
1.6 The Effect of Highways on the Relative Demand for Skilled
Labor
This section tests the H-O prediction that by facilitating trade, highways increase the relative
wage-bill of non-production workers in counties with a highly skilled workforce and decrease it
in counties with a less educated workforce.26 To test this prediction I interact the exogenous
reduction in the cost of trade caused by the Interstate Highway System with pre-existing
differences in human capital endowment. As explained in Section IV, there are no micro data
that identify individuals' county of residence during the relevant time period. I therefore
use the fraction of high school educated workers among persons 25 years and older in 1950
(before the Interstate Highway System was constructed) as a measure of a county's skill
endowment. I use non-production and production workers in manufacturing as proxies for
26As Table 1 shows, the sample counties are on average less skill abundant than the rest of the US.
However, there is considerable variation in the sample counties' skill endowment, and about a quarter of the
sample of counties had a higher fraction of high-school graduates than the US average in 1950.
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high- and low-skilled labor, respectively. 27
In order to examine this prediction I estimate a regression of the form:
In (SH) = Sc + Pt + 3d1 975hc + yd1 975hcsc,1 950 + Jd1 9755c,1 950 + 6 ct, (22)
where In (SH) = In (hd) = In (H/wt) - In (Ht/Lct) denotes the wage-bill of non-
production workers in manufacturing, relative to production workers. The fraction of high
school graduates among persons 25 years and older in 1950 is sc,1950, and d1975 is a dummy
for post-1975.2 8 Other specifications include county-level covariates, and IV estimates using
zl,c and Z2,c, interacted with appropriate terms, to instrument for terms that include the
highway dummy, h.
The first column of Panel A in Table 7 presents estimates of this equation under the
constraint that y = 6 = 0. The results show that on average, highways did not increase the
relative demand for skill. Subsequent columns relax this constraint, and test the prediction
that , < 0 and y > 0. These results do suggest that highways significantly increased
the relative demand for non-production workers in counties that had a highly skilled labor
force and reduced it elsewhere. The results are robust to controlling for the contemporaneous
fraction of high school graduates in the labor force and for time-varying coefficients on region
dummies, distance from the county to the nearest city, and 1950 population density. The IV
estimates using the 1944 plan are somewhat larger estimates than the OLS estimates, while
the direction instrument is not precise enough to identify the effect of highways on labor
demand.2 9
2 7Census data for 1960 and 1980 indicate that non-production workers in manufacturing industries had
about 2-3 more years of education than production workers. For further discussion of the differences between
production and non-production workers see Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994).
2 8These regressions are weighted by 1950 population, since data for low population counties are less precise.
2 9To test the hypothesis that the effect of highways on the relative wage-bill of skilled manufacturing
workers varies by land endowment I add the interaction (1950 population density)*(post 1975)* highway to
the specification in Table 7, panel A, column 3. This changes beta from -0.168 (0.068) to -0.177 (0.070) and
gamma from 0.609 (0.241) to 0.605 (0.244), suggesting that land endowment has little effect on the outcome
of interest. Taking the same baseline specification and controlling for a county-level index of skill intensity in
manufacturing in 1967 (described in the Appendix) interacted with year dummies yields estimates of -0.153
(0.074) and 0.462 (0.253) for beta and gamma, indicating that these results are also not driven by differential
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The results in Panels B and C of Table 7 suggest that highways increased both the
relative wages and the employment share of non-production workers in high-skill counties,
although most estimates are not precise. Similarly, highways appear to have reduced the
wages and employment of non-production workers where skill was relatively scarce. These
results are consistent with the H-O view, that trade shifts the relative demand curve for
skilled labor. The change in wages and employment shares may reflect a movement along
the relative supply curve for skilled workers. The positive and finite elasticity of the relative
supply of skill may reflect endogenous cross-county migration as well as changes that took
place within counties, such as occupational transition and entry or exit of workers from the
market.
I use the results in Table 7 to evaluate the possibility that the effect of highways on the
wage-bill are due to changes in relative supply correlated with highway location, rather than
a change in relative demand. Assume that the aggregate elasticity of substitution between
high- and low-skilled workers is locally a constant, q7, then the elasticity of the relative
wage-bill of skilled workers with respect to their wages is:
aln(wC/wt) _ 1
a [In (Hct/Ld)] r
There is a consensus in the literature that is higher than 1 (e.g. Freeman 1986; Katz and
Murphy 1992; and the elasticity implied in Angrist 1995). Using these estimates, the effect
of highways (and highways interacted with 1950 schooling) on relative employment should
have been bigger in magnitude than their effect on relative wages, and opposite in sign.
Thus, the estimates in Table 7 suggest that highways changed the relative demand for skill,
rather than the relative supply of skill.
As a further check, I test if highway counties experienced changes in the wage-bill of
non-production workers, relative to production workers, before the highways were completed
or after they were already in place. By time-differencing (22) (post-1975 minus pre-1975) we
time effects on counties with different industry compositions.
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get an expression for the change in the relative wage-bill of non-production workers:
A In (sH) = p +h + yhS 95 + sSc,1950 + $c. (24)
I estimate this equation using OLS (with and without county-level controls) and IV, instru-
menting hc and hcsc,1 950 using Zi,c and Zi,scc,1950, where i = 1, 2. Since data is not available for
all counties and all years, I restrict myself to a constant sample of counties, for which I have
data in 1947, 1967, 1982, and 1992. The results (Table 8) show that before the construc-
tion of highways was complete (1947-1967) the changes in the relative demand for skill did
not vary significantly between highway and non-highway counties. This is true for both the
OLS estimates (with and without county-level controls) and the IV estimates using the 1944
plan. As before, the direction instrument is not powerful enough to give precise results. The
estimates for 1967-1982 are similar in magnitude to those found in Table 7. The estimate of
the main effect of highways, 7, is statistically significant only in the IV estimate, while the
estimate of d is significant in all specifications. Finally, the changes that took place from
1982-1992 do not vary significantly across highway and non-highway counties. These results
lend support to the hypothesis the Interstate Highway System was indeed the cause of the
changes in the relative demand for skilled labor.
In order to assess the magnitude of the effect of trade I compare my estimates to those of
Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1997). Borjas et al. use a factor-content approach to measuring
the effect of trade on wage inequality. They find that imports to the U.S. from less-developed
countries as a fraction of GDP increased by about 1.6 percentage points from 1980-1995.
Using factor-content analysis they calculate that this increase could have raised the skill
premium by about 0.9 - 1 percentage points.30 This suggests that the elasticity of the skill
premium with respect to (Imports/GDP) was about 0.6.
Using my estimates for trucking (Table 4) I assume that highways increased trade by
3 0 This figure reflects the change in wages of college graduates relative to high-school graduates and of
high-school graduates compared to high-school dropouts.
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about 7 percentage points in counties they crossed, relative to other counties. Data from the
commodity flow survey of 1997 suggests that value of goods traded domestically in the U.S.
was roughly equal to the GDP. I assume that during the 1970s the ratio of domestic trade to
GDP was about 0.9. This suggests that the change in (domestic trade/local GDP) induced
in highway counties, relative to other counties, was about 0.063. In 1950, the fraction of
high school graduates in the mean county in the sample was 0.251 with a standard deviation
of 0.103. The OLS estimate of the effect of highways on the relative wage-bill of high-skilled
workers (Table 7 Panel A, column 2) in a county that is one standard deviation above the
mean level of education is 0.072 (p-value 0.03). The IV estimate (Table 7 Panel A, column 6)
is 0.061 (p-value 0.12). This suggests that the elasticity of the relative wage-bill with respect
to (domestic trade/local GDP) for a county that is one standard deviation above the mean
level of education is close to 1.31 The estimates of the skill premium are somewhat smaller
in magnitude and less precise.
The assumptions used in this paper are quite different from those used in the factor-
content analysis of Borjas et al. (1997).32 However, despite the differences in assumptions
and sources of variation, the magnitude of our estimates appears quite comparable. My
results therefore support the view that while trade may contribute to changes in labor market
inequality, its effects are limited in magnitude.
1.7 The Effect of Highways on the Industrial Composition
The theoretical framework also predicts that trade will change the industry composition of
employment. Specifically, it predicts that trade causes a skill-abundant economy to shift
its production towards more skill-intensive goods and vice versa for an economy where skill
is scarce. In order to test this prediction I construct a measure of the skill intensity of
3 1Similar calculations yield estimates that are close to 0 for a county with the mean level of education and
about -1.3 for a county that is one s.d. below the mean level of education.
3 2Factor-content analysis typically assumes the absence of non-competing imports, no endogenous response
of factor supplies to trade, and identical elasticities of substitution across all production functions and the
utility function (Panagariya 2000).
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each industry. I match the two-digit SIC codes to the 1950 classification of manufacturing
industries in the household census and compute the fraction of non-production workers each
industry's labor force. Using the County Business Patterns data I compute an index of
the skill intensity of the manufacturing workforce: It = Ei ni,1960id, where ni,1960 is the
fraction of non-production workers employed in industry i in 1960 and Iic is the fraction (or
estimated fraction) of the manufacturing employees in county c employed in industry i at
time t. See Appendix C for details on the construction of the data.
To test whether trade changed the industrial composition of employment in manufactur-
ing, I estimate regressions of the following form:
Ict = c + Pt + pd1 975hc + yd1975hcsc,195 o + Jd1 975Sc,1 950 + ct (25)
I estimate the equation using OLS and IV, instrumenting the various interactions of the
highway dummy with corresponding interactions of the two instruments. The estimated
coefficients of interest, B and y, are of the expected sign, but they are not statistically
significant in any of the specifications (Table 9). Thus we cannot reject the hypothesis that
trade has no effect on the industrial composition of employment.3 3
There are two possible ways to interpret the absence of significant effects of removing
trade barriers on industrial composition. One approach is to interpret these results as evi-
dence that the theoretical framework outlined in section II may be incomplete. For example,
there may be frictions that restrict the mobility of labor across industries. My findings may
also suggest that endogenous migration may have played only a limited role, since migration
is likely to have reinforced the effects of trade on industrial composition (see Appendix B).34
In related work, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) survey a number of recent studies that find
very little effect of tariff reductions on industry composition in developing countries. These
3 3Note that even if factors are not perfectly mobile across industries, trade could still affect the relative
demand for skill by changing the relative prices of commodities.
3 4However, Card and Lewis (2005) find that even inflows of low-skilled workers had limited effects on
the industrial composition in U.S. cities. Lewis (2005) argues that firms may vary the skill intensity of the
production technique in response to migration.
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studies attribute their findings to imperfections of product markets or labor markets.
Alternatively, it is possible that my estimation strategy is not precise enough to estimate
such effects.35 For example, it may be that changes in labor demand have taken place at
lower levels of industry aggregation or even within product classes (Schott 2004). Moreover,
the absence of accurate employment data in many county-industry cells requires a process
of imputation that may have resulted in non-negligible measurement error (see Appendix
C). Further research may be needed to determine the extent to which the removal of trade
barriers affects the industrial composition.
1.8 Concluding Remarks
The literature on international trade suggests that trade may affect the demand for skill, but
it has proved difficult to identify this effect, since identification requires exogenous variation
in the barriers to trade. In this paper I use the advent of the U.S. Interstate Highway System
as a source of exogenous variation in trade barriers. The Interstate Highway System was
built to better connect large cities, to serve national defense, and to connect with major
routes in Canada and Mexico. As an unintended consequence of meeting these objectives,
the highways crossed many rural counties. I find that the rural Interstate Highways were
particularly important for the flow of large trucks. These highways increased trucking activity
and retail sales by about 7-10 percentage points per capita in rural counties they crossed,
relative to other rural counties.
Using the Interstate Highway System as a source of variation for trade, I test whether
trade affected the demand for skill in rural areas. I find that on average, highways had no
effect on the demand for high-skilled workers relative to low-skilled workers in manufacturing.
However, highways increased the wage-bill of high-skilled workers relative to low-skilled
workers in counties where skill was abundant, and reduced it where skill was scarce. This
finding is consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin view that trade increases the relative demand
3 5Revenga (1992) finds that U.S. industries faced with increasing import competition due to changes in
exchange rates did reduce their employment and relative wages.
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for the abundant factor. However, the magnitude of the effect is quite small: in a county
that exceeds the mean level of education by one standard deviation, the elasticity of the
wage-bill of non-production workers relative to production workers in manufacturing with
respect to the ratio of domestic trade to local GDP is roughly equal to 1. In addition, I find
no evidence for the prediction of the Heckscher-Ohlin model that trade significantly shifts the
industrial composition of employment towards industries intensive in the abundant factor.
This result suggests that changes in skill composition in response to reduced trade barriers
may have taken place within industries or product classes, or that trade may have increased
the demand for skill in skill-abundant counties through other channels.
My findings suggest that the ongoing expansion of trade between economies that differ
in their skill endowment, such as trade between the developed world and the less-developed
world, may continue to contribute to changes in labor market inequality. However, my results
also indicate that opening to trade is not likely to explain a great deal of the variation in
the demand for skill experienced by many countries in recent years.
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1.9 Appendix A. Open Economy with Factor-Price Equalization
In this appendix I derive the open-economy equilibrium with equalized factor prices. Denote
the home economy's share of low-skilled labor by ~ = L/(L + L*). The ratio of the stock of
high-skilled workers to low-skilled workers in the two economies together
H+H*h L+ = L h + (1 - )h*. (26)
Since factor prices are equal in both economies and the production technology is assumed
to be identical, the factor requirements in producing both goods are the same in the two
countries.
The equilibrium conditions for high-skilled labor in the two countries are:
H |=[1 l(z)b(z)c(z) [(WLL + WHH) + (WLL* + WHH*)]H = P (Z) dz and
o P(z)
H*= (1 - a(z)) b(z)c(z) [(wLL + WHH) + (WLL* + WHH*)]dz, (27)
~ P ~~P(z)
where a(z) is the fraction of total output of good z produced in the home economy. Producing
one unit of commodity z requires a(z) units of low-skilled labor and c(z) units of high-skilled
labor.
Combining the equations above we get an expression for the stock of high-skilled workers
relative to low-skilled workers:
' b(z)h(w; z)(1 + wh)
wh~ dz =h. (28)0 1 + wh(w; z)
Similarly, by adding the equilibrium conditions for low-skilled labor we find that
b(z)(1 +h) 1. (29)1 + wh(w; z)d
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Putting together the results for both factors we have
( h) = b(z)1 + WPEh) [h( dz =0, (30)
o1 +h(W&pP; z) FpE"' (30)
where w = WTpE is the equilibrium skill premium with trade and factor price equalization.
1.10 Appendix B. Open Economy with Endogenous Migration
This Appendix extends the analysis to account for the possibility that workers migrate in
response to the change in relative wages induced by the opening to trade. I assume that
people differ in their preferences for living in either of the two economies, and that their
preferences are correlated with their skill:
Uijk =" 01 b(z) ln di(z)dz + (1 - 01) ln iq + 02Iij'ik, (31)
0
where Uijk is the utility of a person i with skill level j E H, L}, and the subscript
k denotes home or foreign economy. The consumption of good z is denoted by di(z) and
housing is denoted by i. Iij is an indicator for whether person i is skilled, Iik is an indicator
for living in the home economy and 02 is the preference of skilled workers for living in the
home economy. I assume that the supply of housing in each of the economies is constrained
by a fixed supply of land, qk:
lIikqidi = q. (32)
A group of high-skilled workers of measure 1 residing in economy k consumes dH (z) =
01b (z) Wk units of good z and (+Wkqh)k units of housing. Similarly, a group of low-skilled
workers of measure 1 residing in economy k consumes dL (z) = lb (z) kaZ) units of good
z and -u-k-- units of housing. If all goods are produced at home (or if trade equalizes(1+wkh)Lk
factor prices) then dH (z) = 0lb (z) wkf/(h(wk;z)) and dL () = 9lb (z) f.(h(k;Z))) .36 Hence their1+wjkh(wk;z) l+wkh(wk;z)
36To derive the last two equations notice that Pk (z) = a(z)w L + c(z)w, h(z) = c(z)/a(z) and a(z) =
[f. (h(Lk; ))]-.
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indirect utility of type j residing in country k as a function of the skill premium and the
population of low-skilled workers is:
ri (WkII + (1- Ij)) f. (h(wk; z))
Uijk (Wk, Lk) = 01 b(z)ln (0lb (z) z + )kh(k; Z))
+ (1 - 01)n (1kI + (- h) k + 2IjIk, (33)
where f, (h(wk; z)) = Fz (H(z), L(z)) /L(z) is output per low-skilled worker in producing
good z.
In order to analyze the effect of trade on the utility of both types, consider the utility
of a representative agent in economy k, who owns 1 unit of low-skilled labor and h units of
high-skilled labor.37
I o (Wkh + 1) f+ (h(k; ))\Uik (Wk, Lk) =1 ] b(z) ln K0lb (z) 1  Wkh(k; Z) dz+
+ (1-01) In (34)
Assume that production functions are Cobb-Douglas and trade equalizes factor prices (before
migration takes place), so the elasticity of substitution between high- and low skilled labor
is one. In this case the relative wage bill of skilled workers in each industry, wkh(wk; z), is
constant. The first welfare theorem implies that the choice of inputs maximizes the welfare
of the representative agent (34). Since Wkh(Wk; z) is constant, the choice of inputs maximizes:
rl
1 b(z) ln fz (h(wk; z)) dz given Wk. Therefore, using the envelope theorem:
0
fk [/ b(z) ln f (h(wk; z)) dz] = 0. (35)
Using (35), we conclude that when production functions are Cobb-Douglas, OUisk(wk) > 0
and aUiLk(Wk) < 0, so high-skilled workers prefer a higher skill premium, while low-skilled
: 7To simplify the analysis I assume that the representative agent derives no utility from living in either
economy.
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workers prefer a lower skill premium. Since aUi(Wk) < 0 and UiaLk(k) < 0, both types8Lk <Lk
prefer a lower population of low-skilled workers in their economy (holding relative wages
fixed), because a higher population implies higher housing prices. By continuity, these
results also hold if the elasticity of substitution in production of all goods is sufficiently close
to one.
In order to analyze the equilibrium, it is convenient to begin by considering the case where
free migration is possible but there is no trade between the two economies. I focus on the case
where workers choose to live in both economies.38 If 02 = 0 there is a symmetric equilibrium
in which both economies have an equal number of workers. To prove the existence and
uniqueness of this equilibrium, consider the conditions for indifference of the two types of
workers between the two economies. As figure Al shows, the indifference curve of high-skilled
workers between the two economies (UH) is upward sloping in the space of the home economy
skill premium, w, and the relative supply of low-skilled labor L/L*, while the indifference
curve for low-skilled workers (UL) is downward sloping. Holding all else constant, as w
approaches zero high-skilled workers require a lower level of L/L* than low-skilled workers
to be indifferent between the two economies. Similarly, if w is high enough, low skilled
workers require a lower level of L/L* than high-skilled workers for indifference. Since the
utility functions are continuous, there is a unique equilibrium combination of w and L/L*.
Given a fixed aggregate supply of high- and low-skilled labor in both economies together,
w and L/L* determine a unique level of h in the home economy. This, in turn, implies a
unique level of employment of skilled workers in the foreign economy and hence a unique
skill premium w*.
Now consider the case where high-skill workers prefer to live in one of the two economies
(02 0). Without loss of generality I assume that 02 > 0, so ceteris paribus high-skilled
workers prefer to reside in the home economy. The indifference curve for the high-skilled
38 There are also two other equilibria in which all the workers reside in either of the two economies. In this
case no worker has an incentive to migrate, because production (and positive wages) are only possible with
both types of workers.
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workers is below the indifference curve corresponding to 02 = 0 (see indifference curve UH
Figure 1). In equilibrium the skill premium w and the relative employment of low-skilled
labor (L/L*) are lower. High-skill workers are indifferent between the two economies because
the price and wage differentials offset their preference for the home economy. Low-skilled
workers are also indifferent because in the home economy they have higher wages and a
higher price of housing.
Suppose that 02 > 0 and the economies open to trade with each other. Assume that
there is no initial response of migration and that factor endowments do not differ too much,
so initially trade equalizes factor prices. The equilibrium analysis is identical to the cases
outlined without migration, except that now the fraction of income spent on each good z
is a fraction 01 of its share when there was no expenditure on housing. As we saw, trade
raises the skill premium in the home economy and decreases it in the foreign economy.
Since factor prices are equalized, high-skilled workers migrate to the home economy, raising
the price of housing. Therefore low-skilled workers migrate to the foreign economy. In
equilibrium, the wage premium in the home economy must be lower than in the foreign
economy (otherwise all high-skilled workers choose to reside in the home economy, as do all
low-skilled workers). However, if we assume that on aggregate high- and low-skilled labor
are not gross complements, trade increases the wage-bill share of the abundant factor in each
economy.
In summary, when migration is costless trade increases the wage-bill share of high-skilled
workers in the skill intensive economy by increasing their relative employment. To the extent
that migration is costly, the increase is mainly due to a change in relative wages. Migration
also induces a larger change in the composition of production due to Rybczynski effects: an
increase in the share of high-skilled workers increases the skill content of production and
exports of the home economy.
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1.11 Appendix C. Industrial Composition Data
The data on each county's employment in 2-digit SIC industries are from the County Business
Patterns data set. For 1977-1997 I use publicly available data from the University of Virginia,
and for 1967 and 1972 I use data from the University of California Berkeley Data Center.
There are two important differences between the two sources of data. First, industries were
re-classified in the 1970s, so I exclude from the data SIC 19 (Ordinance), which only exists
for the earlier years. Second, the earlier data are reported only for county-industry cells with
100 employees or more or at least 10 establishments. Moreover, the data reports employment
by establishment size categories, which have changed slightly over time, and exact overall
employment is not reported for all counties. In order to solve these problems I assume that
the employment in an establishment with a given size category is the geometric average of the
category's two limits. I then use a regression to predict the employment in establishments
in the largest size category for each year. When total employment is not available I predict
it using a regression. Finally, to ensure comparability over time, I exclude county-industry
cells with less than 10 establishments or with fewer than 100 workers (or fewer than 100
predicted workers) for 1977-1997. Using this data I calculate the fraction of manufacturing
employees in each county, industry, and year.
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Table 4. Effect of highways on In(earnings in trucking and warehousing per capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1972 0.022 0.026 0.009 0.028 0.027
(0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021)
1977 0.074 0.084 0.069 0.083 0.077
(0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032)
1982 0.061 0.079 0.083 0.093 0.082
(0.037) (0.038) (0.040) (0.039) (0.037)
1987 0.078 0.090 0.090 0.100 0.088
(0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.044) (0.043)
1992 0.115 0.149 0.158 0.154 0.144
(0.049) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.048)
1997 0.041 0.086 0.117 0.093 0.089
(0.052) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Observations 12,220 12,220 12,220 12,220 12,220
Weights Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region*year No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance*year No No No Yes Yes
1950 Pop. density*year No No No No Yes
Notes: All estimates are from a panel of the sample counties that includes county and year dummies.
Each column reports highway*year interactions from a seperate regression, and the omitted interaction
is highway* 1969. The weights are 1950 population. Robust standards errors in parenthesis are clustered
at the county level. Distance denotes the distance in miles from the county centroid to the nearest large
city.
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Table 5. Effect of highways on In(retail sales per capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-0.013
(0.010)
-0.031
(0.012)
-0.029
(0.014)
-0.027
(0.017)
0.023
(0.020)
0.034
(0.020)
0.057
(0.023)
0.076
(0.025)
0.087
(0.025)
0.101
(0.027)
Observations 21,839
Weights
Region*year
Distance*year
1950 Pop. density*year
Yes
No
No
No
-0.002
(0.009)
-0.018
(0.010)
-0.011
(0.011)
-0.001
(0.014)
0.042
(0.015)
0.053
(0.016)
0.078
(0.018)
0.102
(0.021)
0.110
(0.021)
0.135
(0.022)
21,839
Yes
Yes
No
No
-0.010
(0.009)
-0.032
(0.010)
-0.033
(0.011)
-0.019
(0.014)
0.032
(0.016)
0.051
(0.017)
0.078
(0.020)
0.107
(0.021)
0.118
(0.022)
0.149
(0.024)
21,839
No
Yes
No
No
-0.003
(0.009)
-0.016
(0.010)
-0.007
(0.011)
-0.005
(0.014)
0.033
(0.015)
0.045
(0.016)
0.072
(0.019)
0.086
(0.020)
0.095
(0.020)
0.123
(0.022)
21,839
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Notes: All estimates are from a panel of the sample counties that includes county and year dummies.
Each column reports highway*year interactions from a seperate regression, and the omitted interaction
is highway* 1948. The weights are 1950 population. Robust standards errors in parenthesis are clustered
at the county level. Distance denotes the distance in miles from the county centroid to the nearest large
city.
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1954
1958
1963
1967
1972
1977
1982
1987
1992
1997
0.000
(0.009)
-0.011
(0.010)
-0.003
(0.011)
-0.002
(0.014)
0.032
(0.016)
0.043
(0.017)
0.070
(0.019)
0.080
(0.020)
0.089
(0.021)
0.117
(0.022)
21,839
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
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Table 7. Effect of highways on the demand for skill in manufacturing
OLS IV
Instrument
1944 Direction
plan to city
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A. Dependent variable: In(relative wage-bill of non-production workers)
(Post-1975)*highway 0.006 -0.149 -0.168 -0.151 -0.101 -0.223
(0.024) (0.069) (0.068) (0.077) (0.069) (0.094)
(Post-1 975)*highway*(1950 hs)
(Post-1975)*(1950 high school)
Observations
0.623
(0.249)
0.609
(0.241)
-0.443 -0.323
(0.148) (0.213)
5,795 5,795 5,793
0.564 0.456
(0.262) (0.247)
-0.208
(0.255)
-0.077
(0.093)
4,455 4,455
0.802
(0.312)
-0.278
(0.271)
-1.370
(2.049)
4.177
(5.960)
-1.200
(1.683)
4,455 4,455
B. Dependent variable: In(relative wage of non-production workers)
(Post-1 975)*highway -0.051
(0.020)
(Post- 1975)*highway*(1950 hs)
(Post-1975)*(1950 high school)
Observations
-0.129 -0.113
(0.059) (0.059)
0.313
(0.202)
0.274
(0.206)
-0.251 -0.479
(0.134) (0.220)
4,456 4,456 4,455
-0.113
(0.059)
0.274
(0.206)
-0.479
(0.220)
-0.069
(0.058)
0.130
(0.207)
0.022
(0.085)
4,455 4,455
-0.136
(0.077)
0.312
(0.262)
-0.484
(0.230)
-1.259
(1.573)
3.098
(4.563)
-1.145
(1.285)
4,455 4,455
C. Dependent variable: In(relative employment of non-production workers)
(Post-1975)*highway 0.063
(0.027)
(Post-1 975)*highway*(1950 hs)
(Post-1975)*(1950 high school)
Observations
-0.004 -0.037
(0.081) (0.079)
0.264 0.289
(0.278) (0.267)
-0.134 0.276
(0.179) (0.257)
4,461 4,461 4,460
-0.038 -0.032
(0.079) (0.075)
0.290
(0.267)
0.326
(0.268)
0.272 -0.099
(0.258) (0.103)
4,455 4,455
-0.087
(0.096)
0.490
(0.320)
0.206
(0.276)
-0.111
(1.646)
1.079
(4.808)
-0.055
(1.373)
4,455 4,455
Notes: All estimates are from a panel of the sample counties that includes county and year dummies.
All estimates use data for 1967-1982, and include 1950 population weights. Robust standards errors in
parenthesis are clustered by county. Columns 1-3 use the full sample, and columns 4-7 use a fixed
sample size across panels. Columns 3-7 control for region*year, (distance to nearest city)*year, and
(1950 population density)* year interactions, and the fraction of high-school graduates among 25+ year-
olds. Column 5 uses a state-level index of the fraction of highways completed.
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Table 8. Effect of highways on the demand for skill in manufacturing
OLS IV
Instrument
direction to
Dependent variable: change in In(relative 1944 plan city
wage-bill of non-production workers) (1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Before highway construction was complete:
-0.069 -0.052
(0.120) (0.119)
Highway*(1950 high school) 0.476
(0.415)
-0.547
(0.248)
(1950 high school)
0.322
(0.414)
-0.754
(0.381)
1947-1967
0.049
(0.159)
-0.062
(0.524)
-0.639
(0.394)
B. When highway construction was being completed: 1967-1982
Highway
Highway*(1950 high school)
(1950 high school)
C. After the construction of highways was complete: 1982-1992
Highway
Highway*(1950 high school)
(1950 high school)
Highway 0.209
(1.385)
-0.814
(4.200)
-0.391
(1.178)
-0.140
(0.089)
0.736
(0.309)
-0.335
(0.199)
-0.134
(0.089)
0.655
(0.309)
-0.098
(0.280)
-0.228
(0.106)
0.929
(0.360)
-0.167
(0.298)
0.719
(1.307)
-2.202
(3.920)
0.702
(1.091)
0.047
(0.076)
-0.076
(0.275)
0.243
(0.169)
0.082
(0.075)
-0.233
(0.261)
-0.070
(0.241)
0.077
(0.102)
-0.125
(0.344)
-0.116
(0.245)
-0.114
(1.156)
1.171
(3.464)
-0.592
(0.932)
Notes: Cross section regression using a fixed subsample of 1,072 counties for which data exists in
1947,1967,1982 and 1992. Columns 2-4 control for region dummies, distance to nearest city, and 1950
population density. Robust standards errors are in parenthesis.
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Chapter 2
Technology, Complexity and Information:
The Evolution of Demand for Office Workers
2.1 Introduction
Information processing is an important part of work in all firms and organizations, yet we
know relatively little about its determinants. In this paper, I analyze manufacturing firms'
demand for workers who process information - clerical office workers (clerks). Clerks are
skilled workers, who accounted for over 11 percent of the US manufacturing workforce in
2000. Clerks use information technology equipment to generate, store, and communicate
information. The information that clerks process is an intermediate input that facilitates
the coordination of production.
Production technologies vary in the extent of the division of labor they require. Studies
of the division of labor date back to Adam Smith (1776), and recent theoretical work argues
that the coordination of specialized workers who perform different tasks is costly (Becker
and Murphy 1992; Garicano 2000). This paper examines the hypothesis that firms' costs of
coordination, proxied by the fraction of clerks in their workforce, increase in the extent of
their division of labor.
In order to test this hypothesis empirically, I characterize a production process as com-
plex when it requires a diverse set of occupations. Specifically, I define the complexity of
a manufacturing industry as one minus the Herfindahl index of the occupations of its em-
ployees, excluding managers, clerks, accountants, and auditors. The ranking of industries by
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complexity is stable over time, likely reflecting differences in their technology of production.
For example, textile industries employ an occupationally homogenous workforce and there-
fore have low complexity. By contrast, manufacturers of transportation equipment employ
an occupationally heterogeneous workforce, so their complexity is high. Figure 1 shows that
manufacturing industries' complexity has risen over the 20th century.
Figure 1 also shows that more complex industries have consistently employed relatively
more clerks. In 2000, an increase of 1 standard deviation in an industry's measure of com-
plexity was associated with an increase of about 1 percentage point (or about 8 percent) in
the fraction of clerks in its workforce. In earlier decades this relationship was even stronger -
from 1910-1980 an increase of 1 s.d. in complexity was associated with an increase of 1.3-2.9
percentage points (16-25 percent) in clerks' fraction of employment.
In order to further test the hypothesis that complexity increases firms' demand for infor-
mation, I study an early information technology (IT) revolution, which took place around
the turn of the 20th century. Before 1880, information technology was very limited, and so
was the use of clerks. However, from 1880-1910 telephones, typewriters, and vertical filing
techniques came into widespread use (Yates 1989). Figure 2 shows that the diffusion of
telephones and typewriters during those years was rapid. These innovations dramatically
increased the productivity of clerks and made it cost-effective for firms to use information
more intensively. Interestingly, Figure 3 shows that the fraction of clerks in the manufactur-
ing workforce increased from little more than 1 percentage point in 1880 to over 6 percentage
points in 1910.' At the same time, clerks earned about twice as much as production workers,
and the clerical earnings premium appears to have been stable from 1890-1910 (Figure 4).2
This evidence suggests that the early information technology (IT) revolution increased the
overall demand for clerks relative to other manufacturing workers. Importantly, I find that
industries that were more complex in 1880 increased their demand for clerks significantly
Figure 1 also shows that the employment share of managers and other white-collar employees increased
much more slowly over the same period.
2 Wage data before 1939 are not nationally representative and should therefore be treated with some
caution.
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more than other industries over the next 30 years.
The increased demand for clerks during the early information technology revolution had
two important implications. First, the changes in office technology increased the demand for
clerks, who were highly skilled workers, at a time when high-school graduation rates were
low (Figure 5). The rise of the High-School Movement after 1910 (Goldin 1998) may have
been, at least in part, a response to this increased demand for skill. Second, technological
change in the office can help explain the integration of women into the labor force during the
20th century. Although men outnumbered women among clerks employed in manufacturing
in 1910, this relationship reversed over the subsequent decades. Thus, women's increased
labor force participation during the 20th century was facilitated by the technological change
that increased the demand for clerks.
In contrast to the early IT revolution, the computer revolution that took place in recent
decades had very different implications for the employment of clerks. In fact, the availability
of improved IT equipment from 1960-2000 caused firms to substitute computers for clerks.
Figure 3 shows the decline in the share of clerks in total manufacturing employment, and Fig-
ure 4 shows a decline in their relative wages. Three mechanisms facilitated the substitution
of computers for clerks: direct replacement of clerical jobs by machines, indirect replacement
due to increased productivity in the performance of clerical tasks, and a re-organization of
tasks that allowed all workers to process information. This finding provides a concrete case
in which technology and a specific set of skills are substitutes rather than complements. In-
terestingly, I find that firms in more complex industries increased their demand for computer
personnel and decreased their demand for clerks more rapidly than other firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple frame-
work that illustrates the main arguments. Section 3 considers the relationship between firm
organization and clerical employment. Section 4 analyzes the early IT revolution and the
increased demand for clerical workers. Section 5 discusses the decline in clerical employment
during the recent computer revolution, and section 6 concludes.
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2.2 A Theory of Demand for Information and Clerks
To frame the key questions of this paper, I construct a framework for analyzing the effect of
technology on the demand for information processing. I conceptualize the process of manu-
facturing as consisting of production and coordination. Production includes all tasks required
to physically make the product. The workers who take part in production are operatives,
craftsmen, laborers, and professional workers. Coordination involves generating, storing, and
communicating information that is used to organize production. The information used to
coordinate production is processed by clerks.3
All manufacturing firms need to perform the tasks required for production, but they can
differ in their approach to coordination. One approach, which I call low information intensity,
relies on informal information to coordinate production. For example, this may involve
foremen supervising different sections of a plant. This approach typically involves costly
misallocation of resources in production. The second approach relies on high information
intensity in coordination. This requires the firm to employ clerks, who use IT equipment to
provide information that ensures a precise allocation of inputs in production.
Assume firms use labor inputs to produce output using a constant elasticity of substitu-
tion (CES) production function:
Yij = [L Li (x)(ca- )/ a dx] (1)
where the information intensity i is either high (h) or low (1) and the industry is indexed by
j. The complexity of the production function, tij, is the measure of the set of different tasks
employed in production. For simplicity, this model considers only labor inputs, rather than
capital inputs, so complexity is closely related to the division of labor.
I assume that firms using high information intensity execute all tasks correctly, so thj =
tj. Firms using low information intensity do not execute all tasks correctly. This may be due
3 Managers' role can be seen as using the information processed by clerks to coordinate production. For
simplicity, their tasks are not modeled in this framework.
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to problems in selecting appropriate workers, assigning them adequate tasks, providing them
adequate complementary inputs, monitoring them or giving them incentives. I assume that
tlj = t, where y measures the efficiency of informal coordination ( y E [0, 1)). In industry
j, a set of workers of measure Li,j (x) is assigned to task x. The elasticity of substitution
between the different tasks is a, and I assume that tasks are gross substitutes (a > 1).
A firm using high information intensity needs to gather information Ij in proportion to
the size of its workforce and the complexity of the technology it uses:
j = (t Lh,j (x) dx) tj (2)
I assume that information is an intermediate input produced using CES technology:
Ij = [a (Lcj) + 3 (Khj)q] 1/, (3)
where L,j and Khj are clerks and IT equipment. The productivity of clerks and IT equip-
ment in producing information is captured by a and , and the elasticity of substitution
between clerks and information technology is ao = 1/ (1 - 7). Given a technology tj, a firm
producing with high information intensity solves the following optimization problem:
Min {wLhj + WcL',j + pK,j} s.t. : (1) -(3), (4)
where the wage of labor is w, the wage of clerks is wc and the price of information technology
equipment is p. Using the assumption that all tasks are equally important, Lh,j (x) = Lh,j/tj,
and total labor demand is:
Lhj = t /(a-1)yj (5)
The demand for clerks and for information technology equipment is:
L[,j = (or + 0)-l / 7 t (a - 2) /(a -1 ) Y (6)h 3~~~~~~y
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Kj = q- c)- 1/ t(-2)/(a-l)y
=hj ,+ )  (7)
where - (wc/ap)7 / (1 l- ). The cost of production with high information intensity is:
Ch,j = t/(a- )wyj + (a + p) - / t(a-2)/(a-1)wj +
( + a/O)-1/ t-)/(-l)py (8)
As long as the elasticity of substitution is sufficiently low (a < 2), the cost function is
decreasing in the level of complexity tj, because the increased efficiency of production with
a more complex technology outweighs the additional cost of information associated with it.4
A firm may choose to rely on low information intensity for supervising work. In this
case it fails to execute some tasks correctly, but it does not need to employ clerks or IT
equipment. The labor demand of a firm producing with low information intensity is:
Llj = Yt& a- )/( a- 1), (9)
and its cost function is:
Clj = t(--a--l)/(a-1)Wy (10)
1,3 = (10)
Cost decreases in tj as long as the elasticity of substitution between tasks is sufficiently
low (a < l-I). If a > 1l- then firms using low information intensity prefer the simplest
technology available.
Using the constant returns to scale property of the production function we can define the
net benefit of switching from low to high information intensity per unit
Ia,j MC,j - MChj = (t -l)/ ( tj-l/(a )w - (11)
(a~ q-,30)--1/7 (a-2)/(--1)W - + /O)l/77 t(aP
I asume that a < 2, so firms always prefer a higher level of technology.
'I asume that a < 2, so firms always prefer a higher level of technology.
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Firms employ clerks if and only if Ia j > 0. Only the firms using high information
intensity employ clerks and information technology equipment, so a decline in the price of
these inputs makes high information intensity more advantageous:
WA < 0, a1Ai< 0. (12)
Hence, firms may switch to using high information intensity if wc or p decline.
Now consider the case where all firms use high information intensity. We can compute
the ratio of clerks to other workers:
c = [(e + /(17) (wc/ap)y/(17)] tj. (13)
Therefore, when all firms use high information intensity:
_c Ocj Oc 02cj
acj > 0, < , ' > O, t > 0. (14)
In other words, the fraction of clerks in the workforce rises as the production function
becomes more complex. An increase in clerks' wages or a decrease in the price of information
technology causes firms to substitute IT equipment for clerks. And finally, the fraction of
clerks in the workforce is more responsive to changes in the price of IT equipment in more
complex industries.
The remainder of this paper uses the framework I outlined to explain the variation in
clerical employment across manufacturing industries and over time. Section 3 focuses on
the cross-sectional prediction, that industries with a more complex production technology
employ more clerks relative to other workers. Cross-industry regressions for all decades from
1910-2000 support the view that a more complex production technology is associated with
more clerical employment.
Section 4 considers the effect of information technology, rather than production technol-
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ogy, on the demand for clerks.I show that before 1880 few clerks were employed in manu-
facturing industries and firms typically relied on informal information. The IT revolution of
1880-1910 induced firms to use information more intensively and employ clerks. Assuming
that the ranking of industries by complexity are stable over time, the model also predicts
that the increase in clerical employment be led by firms that were more complex in 1880. I
compare these predictions with two alternative hypotheses, that an increase in either firm
size or in the supply of educated workers caused the increase in clerical employment.
Finally, the model predicts that when all firms use high information intensity, a decline
in the price of IT equipment reduces the fraction of clerks in the workforce.5 Moreover,
we expect that more complex industries substitute IT equipment for clerks at a faster rate.
Section 5 shows evidence for these predictions using the recent computer revolution.
2.3 Technological Complexity and Demand for Clerks
Technological complexity is a measure of the variety of tasks required to physically make
products. In terms of labor inputs, complex production processes involve an occupationally
diverse workforce. Accordingly, I define complexity as 1 minus the Herfindahl index of oc-
cupations of employees in each industry. This measure is designed to reflect occupational
heterogeneity in production, but not in coordination; therefore, I calculate this measure ex-
cluding managers, clerks, accountants and auditors. My main source of data is the 1 percent
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) of the decennial censuses (Ruggles et al.
1997). Since occupational definitions change over time, I use the IPUMS 1950 classification
of occupations and industries throughout the paper.6
Appendix Table Al shows the industries with particularly high or low levels of complexity
from 1880-2000. During the early 20th century complexity was positively correlated with
using continuous-process or batch-production technologies (Chandler 1977; Goldin and Katz
5 Assuming that effect of the fall in the price of IT on reducing the demand for clerks dominates the effect
of an increase in complexity on the demand for clerks.
6Computer-related occupations are the only exception to this rule, since they are only defined from 1970
onwards. The appendix discusses various measurement issues pertaining to the data.
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1998), as industries using these technologies ranked above the median level of complexity. 7
In subsequent decades transportation industries ranked among the most complex industries,
while textile and clothing industries were among the least complex.
Comparisons of industries and occupations over time should be taken with caution, even
though they rely on a fixed classification of occupations. With this caveat in mind, note that
complexity appears to have risen over time (Table 1). Complexity rankings are also very
consistent over time: from 1880-1940 the decade-by-decade correlation of complexity ranged
from 0.5-0.9, and since 1940 it has exceeded 0.9.
In order to examine the relationship between complexity and information processing, I
investigate the employment of clerks. An examination of clerical occupations shows that
they use IT equipment to generate, store, and communicate information, which is used for
coordination. Throughout the 20th century clerical occupations in manufacturing included
stenographers, typists, secretaries, bookkeepers, shipping and receiving clerks, and office ma-
chine operators. In recent decades, clerks have often also been employed in record processing,
material recording, scheduling and distribution, providing information, and message distri-
bution (Hunt and Hunt 1986).
Clerks differ from other white collar workers, since their main task is to process infor-
mation that is used to coordinate production. By contrast, engineers and other professional
workers typically process information that is used to design products or a processes. Sales
workers may also process information as part of their work, but their main objective is to sell
products. Clerks also differ from managers, since managers perform actual coordination and
supervision. However, during the 19th century the distinction between clerks and managers
was not as clear as it is today, as managers often processed information themselves. There-
fore, in the empirical analysis I consider the differential effect of complexity on managers
and clerks.
The task of processing information are typically skill-intensive, so clerks are more skilled
7Industries using continuous-process or batch-production technologies include beverages, dairy products,
grain-mill product, paints and varnishes and petroleum refining.
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than most other manufacturing workers. The earliest nationally representative micro data
that identifies the education and occupation of individuals is the 1940 Census. Table 2 shows
the education of clerks and other workers, over age 50, who were employed in manufacturing
in 1940. Clerks had much higher levels of education than other workers, suggesting that
even if we account for changes in occupation and industry and attrition from the labor force,
clerks were highly educated workers in the early decades of the 20th century.8 Table 2 also
shows that the skill gap between clerks and other workers persisted at least through 1980,
although it has narrowed over time.
The model predicts that when firms use high information intensity, more complex indus-
tries employ more clerks relative to other workers. In order to test this hypothesis I use
individual-level census data to estimate a linear probability model:
cij = atj + 3kj + zi + ij, (15)
where cij is an indicator for person i, working in industry j, being employed as a clerk
(or a manager). The regressor of interest is industry j's complexity, tj. I also include
individual level geographic controls (zi) and some specifications also control for the industry's
capital/labor ratio, kj.
The top panel of Table 3 shows results of cross-section regressions without industry-level
controls for each decade from 1900-2000. These results suggest that since 1910, more complex
industries have employed more clerks. An increase of one standard deviation in complexity
was associated with an increase of about 1.6 percentage points in the employment of clerks in
1910. This partial correlation increased to about 2.9 percentage points in 1960 and declined
to about 1 percentage point in 2000. In other words, from 1910-1980 a change in one standard
deviation of complexity corresponded to 15-25 percent of the average clerical employment
in manufacturing, declining to 8-13 percent in 1990 and 2000. The results are similar in
8Goldin and Katz (1999) show that clerks were much better educated than blue collar workers in Iowa in
1915.
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magnitude, though less precise, after controlling for the capital/labor ratio. Table 3 also
shows that managerial employment, unlike clerical employment, was not correlated with
higher complexity in 1910 and 1920, and it was substantially weaker throughout the first
half of the 20th century.9 This lends evidence that clerks and managers performed different
tasks even in the early 20th century, so the demand for their services was driven by different
factors.
The evidence presented thus far is consistent with the hypothesis that the coordination
of a more complex production process requires relatively more clerks. In order to further
examine this idea, I examine how more complex industries respond to large changes in the
cost of IT equipment.
2.4 The Early IT Revolution and the Rise of Clerks
This section discusses the early IT revolution, which took place from 1880-1910. I show
that this revolution increased the demand for clerks, and that industries that were more
complex to begin with increased their demand more rapidly. Next, I consider two alternative
explanations for the growth in the demand for clerks. The first hypothesis attributes the
increased demand for clerks to the growth in plant size. The second hypothesis is that
increased supply of educated workers caused firms to develop strategies for employing them
as clerks. I find little support for either hypothesis. Finally, I consider the implications of
the increased demand for clerks on the accumulation of human capital and the employment
of women.
Yates (1989) and Levenstein (1991) describe the IT equipment that came into widespread
use in offices from 1880-1910. The new IT equipment had substantial impact on four different
aspects of information processing: production, copying, storage, and communication.
First, the production of information was enhanced by the advent of the typewriter, which
9The relationship between complexity and managerial employment became significant from 1940 onwards,
with a change of one standard deviation in complexity associated with 0.4-1.5 percentage points (10-20
percent change) in managerial employment. Interestingly, the correlation between complexity and managerial
employment has strengthened in recent decades.
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allowed rapid and inexpensive generation of neat documents. The patent that led to the first
commercially viable typewriter was registered in 1868. During the 1870s the first typewriters
were sold to court reporters and telegraphers. Once the value of typewriters was realized
by firms, their production expanded rapidly, and in 1900 alone over 140,000 machines were
sold. The average annual growth rate of the real value of typewriters produced in the U.S.
from 1890-1909 was 9 percent, and it fell to 3 percent over the subsequent five years (see
Figure 2). Complementary innovations, such as the visible typewriter and the dictaphone,
allowed typists to see their output as they typed and to record dictations. Cash registers
and other office machines also became popular, and from 1890-1909 the real value of such
equipment grew at an average rate of 16 percent; the growth rate fell to a mere 3 percent
over the subsequent five years.l°
Second, the technology for copying information also improved from 1880-1910. Earlier
copying technologies, such as the book press and the rolling press, suffered from substantial
drawbacks, and carbon paper was incompatible with contemporary pens. With the advent of
typewriters, carbon paper allowed clerks to produce several copies at the point of origin. This
innovation reduced copying cost and made documents neater and more durable. Stencils,
first patented in 1876, became useful for mass duplication of internal communication. The
first photocopying machine was invented in 1900, and in 1911 the Taft Commission evaluated
it and found it useful for repeated copying of complicated documents and diagrams. The
widespread use of technologies for producing and copying information increased the use of
paper. From 1890-1910, the tonnage of fine writing paper manufactured in the U.S. grew
at a rate of 6.4 percent per capita, compared to 4.8 percent from 1910-1930 (Feenberg and
Miron 1997).
Third, the technology for storage and retrieval of information was quite limited before
the last decades of the 19th century. Documents were typically stored in pigeonhole desks
that could only accomodate few documents, or in cabinets and flat files that made retrieval
1
°The data on output comes from Roy (1990). Following Goldin and Katz (1995), Table 5, I use the
cost-of-living index due to Rees as the price deflator (Historical Statistics 1997, series E186).
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difficult. Vertical filing was presented to the business world at Chicago's World Fair of
1893. It allowed systematic grouping of documents, quick rearrangement and retrieval, and
substantial saving in storage space.
Finally, the technology for communicating information also improved from 1880-1910.
The telegraph was introduced to America as early as the 1840s, but it proved less useful in
manufacturing than in the railroad industry (Chandler 1977). More important for manufac-
turing was the telephone, which was invented in 1876 and came into commercial use shortly
thereafter. By the 1890s private branch exchanges were used in cities across the U.S., and
around 1900 long distance communication become possible. Figure 2 shows that the annual
growth rate in phones per capita from 1880-1910 was about 16 percent; in the next decade it
fell to about 4 percent.'l According to data from the 1920s to the 1970s, about one-third of
the phones in the U.S. were used by businesses, and this fraction declined only slowly over
time (Historical Statistics 1997). The use of printed communication also grew rapidly: the
annual growth rate of the number of items sent by the U.S. Postal Service was about 5.4
percent from 1874-1910 and only about 1.6 percent from 1910-1970.12
Taken together, this evidence shows that an early information technology revolution took
place from 1880-1910. The key period for this revolution was the first decade of the 20th
century, when technologies for producing, copying, storing and communicating information
matured. This early IT revolution created the potential to use information much more
intensively than before.
Throughout most of the 19th century manufacturing firms made little systematic use of
information for coordination of production. Rather, firms were often managed by owners,
typically with the help of skilled artisans or foremen (Chandler 1977; Hounshell 1984; Yates
1989; Nelson 1995). To be sure, there were exceptional firms that employed innovative
"lSimilarly, Sorkin (1980) finds that the number of telephone connections made by the Bell Company
increased from 1.87 billion to 8.14 billion from 1900-1910. In per capita terms, this reflects an average
annual growth rate of about 14 percent during the first decade of the 20th century, compared to 2.3% in the
subsequent decade and an average growth rate of about 3.5% from 1920-1970.
12Author's calculations are based on data from Bangs (1875) and Sorkin (1980).
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techniques of cost accounting; but these techniques were typically firm-specific and suffered
from substantial shortcomings (Fleischmen and Tyson 1993).
During the late 19th century, a group of managers and engineers led a movement for
"Systematic Management" (Nelson 1980, 1995).13 They promoted systematic cost account-
ing, use of job cards and time clocks, inventory control, centralized purchasing, and incentive
wages. Management literature had barely existed before 1870, but it expanded rapidly dur-
ing the next thirty years. It was also around the turn of the century that several American
universities first established programs in business administration. The next step in expand-
ing the use of information was taken by the movement for "Scientific Management", led by
Frederick W. Taylor. Taylor and his associates served as consultants and initiated changes in
plant management practices. These changes included mechanical innovations, improved cost
accounting and purchasing systems, the introduction of storerooms and planning depart-
ments, use of time studies, and more sophisticated incentive wage systems. While neither
universally adopted nor entirely successful, these changes were a sign of the attempts to use
information for managerial purposes.
Most of the literature on this organizational transformation has focused on the managers
who initiated them (e.g. Chandler 1977 and Nelson 1995), but the role of clerks in facilitating
these changes was no less important. As Table 1 shows, production workers accounted for
about 95 percent of the manufacturing workforce in 1880, while most of the remaining 5
percent were managers and owners. But by 1910 clerks emerged as a new class of white
collar employees in the manufacturing industries, outnumbering managers by about two-to-
three. 14
13The availability of new power sources (steam and later electric power) also allowed more flexibility in
organizing the factory floor, and complemented these changes.
14 Estimates using the IPUMS data and the 1950 occupational definitions suggest that there were about
18,000-20,000 clerks in manufacturing in 1870 and 1880. This figure corresponds to about 1 percent of
the manufacturing labor force. The 1950 classification of clerical occupations appears to match earlier
classification systems well only for data from 1880 onwards, so estimates prior to 1880 are potentially
subject to substantial measurement error. The Census of Manufactures uses a narrower definition of clerical
occupations than the population census. According to these definitions there were fewer than 6,000 and
12,000 clerks in manufacturing in 1870 and 1880.
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Existing data on wages suggest that on average clerks earned almost twice as much as
other manufacturing workers in 1890, reflecting their higher level of education at a time
when high school graduates were scarce.5 As Figure 4 shows, the wage of clerks relative to
other manufacturing workers appears to have remained constant or even increased slightly
from 1890-1910, while clerical employment increased rapidly. This consistent with the view
that the changes in clerical employment reflect a large increase in the relative demand for
clerks.
In order to examine how the changes in demand varied by industry, I use the measure
of complexity introduced in the previous section. The model predicts that more complex
industries increase their employment of clerks more rapidly than other industries, assuming
that complexity ranking of industries is stable over time. To test this hypothesis I estimate
a pooled cross-section regression for 1880, 1900, and 1910:
cijt = a(tj,188ss * It) + x>j/ + Ziy + dj, + TtA + 6 ijt, (16)
where t j,l880 is the complexity of industry j in 1880, It is a dummy for 1910 (after the
information technology revolution had matured), xj includes industry-level controls, dj is a
vector of industry fixed effects and Tt is a vector of year dummies.
As the results in Table 4 show, industries that were more complex in 1880 increased
their employment of clerks more rapidly than other industries over the next three decades.
These results are robust to different weighting methods (columns 1 and 2). Column 3 limits
the sample to industries with large plants. The coefficient of interest, a, is larger and more
precise, suggesting that my results are not driven by industries with small and heterogenous
plants. In a similar vein, I exclude industries that are loosely defined (e.g. miscellaneous
wood products), and the results are similar to the benchmark. The results are also robust to
including only industries with more than 100 observations in 1880 (column 5). Finally I use
15 These data should be taken with some caution, since they are not nationally representative. See Appendix
Table A2 calculations, based on Goldin and Katz (1998).
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an alternative measure of complexity, computed using only production workers; once again,
the results are similar (column 6). These results suggest that an increase of one standard
deviation of complexity in 1880 corresponds to an increase of about 1-2 percentage points (or
about about 15-30 percent) in the employment of clerks in 1910, similar to the cross-sectional
estimates. By comparison, the estimated effect of complexity on the relative employment of
managers is positive but substantially smaller, and only marginally significant.
The evidence presented thus far is consistent with the predictions of the model; I now
consider two alternative explanations for the increase in clerical employment from 1880-1910.
The first alternative explanation is that plant size, rather than complexity, accounts for the
increase in the employment of clerks. 16 Chandler (1977) discusses the growth in the scale
and scope of corporations around the turn of the 20th century. Indeed, my calculations show
that the average number of workers per plant in the median industry increased from about
16 to 40 from 1880-1910. However, the results in Table 4 and 5 indicate that plant size is
uncorrelated with the employment of clerks.
The second alternative explanation is that information technology equipment and clerical
employment increased in response to a rise in the level of education of the labor force.l7 But
Goldin and Katz (1995) estimate that in 1910 only about 5.4 percent of the workforce had
graduated from high school, compared to about 4 percent in 1890. In contrast, after 1910
the high school graduation rates in the U.S. accelerated dramatically (see Figure 5). The
changes in the wage premium for clerks relative to production workers also appear to reflect
this pattern: after remaining stable from 1890-1914, they declined rapidly in subsequent
decades (Table A2). Thus, the aggregate evidence suggests that the increase in high school
graduation rates appears to be an outcome, rather than a cause of the increase in clerical
employment.
To further test the hypothesis that education increased clerical employment in manufac-
16Industry level regressions of complexity on In(number of workers per plant), weighted by the number of
observations in each industry show no statistically significant correlation between these two measures.
"
7This argument echoes Acemoglu (2002), who argues that the skill-bias of technological change in recent
decades may be a result of an endogenous response to the growing number of college graduates.
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turing, I use state-level variation in the level of education. I estimate the following regression
for 1880, 1900 and 1910:
cis= h8 + xi/f + Eis, (17)
where i denotes a person, s denotes her state and cis is an indicator for clerks. The measure
of human capital in each state, h, measures the fraction of children aged 16-18 in school
when the current census and the previous census were held.'8 Finally, xi is a set of industry
level controls. The results in columns 4-6 of Table 5 suggest no significant correlation of
state-level education and the share of clerks in states' manufacturing labor force. I also
test whether the share of clerks in manufacturing employment increased more rapidly from
1880-1910 in states that had more educated workers in 1880 by estimating the following
specification:
cist = a(hs,,1o0 * It) + z3 + dy + T5 + eij, (18)
where z is a vector of state dummies and di is a vector of city size dummies and industry
level controls (complexity and plant size). The results in the last column of Table 5 show
some evidence that human capital stocks may have contributed to the subsequent rise in the
employment of clerks, although the estimate is not statistically significant.
The rise in clerical demand appears to have contributed not only to the increase in the
demand for skill, but also to the employment of women. Rotella (1979), Davis (1982),
Fine (1990) and Hartman Strom (1989, 1992) show that the increased availability of clerical
positions allowed many women to enter the labor force. Indeed, from 1880-1910 the share
of women among clerks employed in manufacturing industries rose from a mere 5.3 percent
to over 36 percent. However, even as late as 1900-1910, men took up more net new clerical
jobs than women. Hence, the feminization of office work appears to have been a response to
a growing demand for qualified and inexpensive workers.
The results in this section show that clerks and information technology equipment were
'"This measure is designed to reduce the measurement error as much as possible.
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complements around the turn of the 20th century. The next section examines whether they
were sill complements in recent decades.
2.5 The Recent IT Revolution and the Decline of Clerks
The computer revolution that has taken place in recent decades shares much in common with
the IT revolution that occurred around the turn of the 20th century. First, computer software
(e.g. word processors and electronic spreadsheets) and hardware (e.g. printers) substantially
reduce the cost of producing information, just as the typewriter had done almost one century
earlier. Second, computers allow us to copy information at almost no cost. Third, computers
allow effective storage and retrieval of vast amounts of information. And finally, computer
networks make communication cheaper and more effective, as the telephone had done in the
past.
In 1970 there were fewer than 75,000 computers in the U.S., but over the next decade
about 875,000 computers were purchased (Phister 1979; Hunt and Hunt 1986). Substantial
reduction in the cost of processing power (Jorgenson 2001; Nordhaus 2001) induced a transi-
tion from mainframe computers to microcomputers. The range of computer applications also
increased over time. By 1984 nearly half of the clerks in the U.S. used computers, compared
to only a quarter of other workers; more recent data show that the fraction of clerks (and
other workers) using computers has since continued to rise (Friedberg 2003). I therefore
conclude that during the 1970s (and possibly the early 1980s) the price of office computers
declined sharply, and we can examine the effect of this decline on the demand for clerks.
The new IT equipment reduced the demand for clerks in three different ways (Hunt and
Hunt 1986; Osterman 1986). First, new equipment has directly replaced clerical workers. For
example, automatic switching replaced telephone operators; office dictation equipment took
the place of stenographers; computer software for pricing insurance supplanted specialized
clerks (raters); automatic mail sorting devices replaced mail clerks; and computerized inven-
tory management software took the place of shipping and receiving clerks. Second, indirect
82
replacement occurred as the new equipment raised the productivity of clerical work, reducing
the number of clerks required to perform a given task. Finally, reorganization of information
processing has also reduced the demand for clerks. For example, some stenographers and
typists lost their jobs when word processing allowed workers to produce information cheaply
and efficiently.
Technological change may also have an opposite effect of increasing the demand for
clerks. Theory predicts that if the complexity of production increases, firms may demand
more information, thereby raising their relative demand for clerks. In addition, Osterman
(1986) argues that a tendency for "information deepening" may also act as a countervailing
force. In other words, the lower cost of processing information may cause firms to produce
more information relative to other intermediate inputs.l9
As Table 1 shows, the fraction of clerks in the manufacturing workforce fell from 14.4
percent in 1960 to 11.4 percent in 2000. This decline does not reflect an increase in the
relative wages of clerks. As Appendix Table A2 shows, the wage of clerks relative to other
manufacturing workers has gradually fallen over this period. Taken together, this evidence
suggests manufacturers' demand for clerk, relative to other workers, has been falling.
Of particular interest is the effect is the differential response of complex industries to the
fall in the price of IT equipment. The first four columns in Table 6 show the cross-sectional
relation between complexity and the employment of computer personnel from 1970-2000.2o
The coefficient is positive in all years, although it is statistically significant at the 5 percent
level only for 1980 and 2000 and marginally significant for 1970 and 1990. These results are
consistent with the model's prediction that more complex industries have higher demand for
information technology equipment.
Given the persistence of complexity, the model predicts that more complex industries
substitute IT equipment for clerks more rapidly than other industries. Assuming that the
19The framework I use assumes that when all firms use high information intensity, information and other
inputs are used in fixed ratios as the price of IT falls.
20 See Data Appendix for a definition of the category of "computer personnel."
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number of computer operators required for each computer does not vary across industries
in each year, we expect that higher complexity leads to greater employment of computer
personnel. Table 6 shows the results of the following regression using data from 1960-1990:
cjt = (tj,1960 * It) + x/ + z'y + d'5 + Tt'A + eijt, (19)
where tj,1960 is the complexity of industry j in 1960, It is a dummy for 1980 and 1990 (after
the computer revolution had matured), xj includes industry-level controls, dj is a vector
of industry fixed effects and Tt is a vector of year effects. The results suggest that more
complex industries significantly reduced their employment of clerks. An increase of one s.d.
in complexity in 1960 is associated with a decrease of about 1.3 percentage points in clerical
employment in 1980 and 1990.
Table 6 also shows that complex industries increased the demand for computer personnel
more than other industries. However, this differntial increase was only about 1/20 in magni-
tude compared to the decline in their employment of clerks. In part, this finding may reflect
the fact that a single computer operator may be in charge of multiple computers or multiple
user interfaces. It may also reflect the capacity of a single computer operator to substitute
multiple clerks that are not using computers. Finally, it is also possible that some jobs may
have been outsourced to service providers outside manufacturing.21
In summary, these findings show that manufacturing industries substituted computer per-
sonnel for clerks, and that this substitution was significantly stronger among more complex
industries.
2.6 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the evolution of the demand for clerks in manufacturing over more than
a century. Clerks are skilled workers who process information that is used to coordinate
2 1Interestingly, complex industries also appear to have increased their demand for managers more than
other industries. This finding suggests that they may face more challenges in coordinating complex produc-
tion processes, even when plenty of information is available.
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production. In order to explore the determinants of the costs of coordination I define the
complexity of an industry's production process as a measure of the occupational hetero-
geneity of its workforce. I show that throughout the 20th century more complex industries
consistently employed relatively more clerks.
I also find that the price of information technology affected the demand for clerks. An
information technology revolution that took place from 1880-1910 introduced to the office in-
novations such as the typewriter, the telephone, and improved filing techniques. During that
period clerks and information technology equipment were complements, since in conjunction
they allowed firms to use information much more intensively than they had previously done.
Importantly, industries that were more complex in 1880 increased their demand for clerks
more rapidly than other industries.
The technology-driven increase in the demand for clerks from 1880-1910 was rapid, and
it had important implications for the US labor force. First, the increased availability of
clerical positions raised the demand for skill at a time when high school graduation rates
were low. This finding suggests that technological change may have contributed to the onset
of the High School Movement from 1910 onwards. Second, the increased demand for clerks
contributed to the rise in labor force participation of women. Like the increased demand for
skill, the rise of women's labor force participation was an important trend that has persisted
throughout the 20th century.
Whereas in the past clerks and IT equipment were complements, in recent decades they
have become substitutes. I find that manufacturing firms have substituted computers for
clerks, reducing the employment share of clerks despite the decline in their relative wages.
This result provides a concrete case in which technology and a specific set of skills are
substitutes rather than complements. Moreover, my findings suggest that the replacement
of clerks by computers was more rapid in more complex industries.
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2.7 Data Appendix
The data for this paper comes primarily from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series
(IPUMS) samples of the U.S. decennial household census. This data includes samples of
approximately 1 percent of the decennial US census from 1860-2000, excluding 1890 and
1930, for which no data is currently available. This data allows a systematic cross-sectional
and longitudinal analysis of the manufacturing workforce, while controlling for geographic
variation. Using the IPUMS 1950 classification of occupations and industries mitigates some
of the problems that could arise from changes in the classification of jobs throughout the
period.22 Nevertheless, before 1880 people were not directly asked for both their occupation
and industry, so the distinction between the two had to be imputed and this created a
potential for substantial measurement error. This data also lacks the wage and educational
attainment of workers before 1940.23 In order to obtain wage data for that period, I rely on
the estimates of Goldin and Katz (1995), which are based on partial data.
I include workers in all manufacturing industries, except for 'miscellaneous manufactur-
ing industries' and 'not specified manufacturing industries'. Dropping these observations
reduced the sample by about 5 percent. Specific occupations that appeared in the data but
seem incompatible with employment in manufacturing were excluded from the sample. These
occupations include: chiropractors; clergymen; dancers and dancing teachers; entertainers;
farm and home management advisors; foresters and conservationists; funeral directors and
embalmers; recreation and group workers; religious workers; therapists and healers; farm-
ers (owners and tenants); farm managers; auctioneers; hucksters and peddlers; real estate
22In the classification of industries, I merged together several industries, in order to facilitate the merg-
ing of the household census data with the census of manufactures data. Specifically, I merged industries
306 (logging) and 307 (sawmills, planing mills, and mill work); industries 336 (blast furnaces, steel works,
and rolling mills) and 337 (other primary iron and steel industries); industries 346 (fabricated steel prod-
ucts) and 347 (fabricated nonferrous metal products); industries 439 (yarn, thread, and fabric mills), 436
(miscellaneous textile mill products) and 449 (miscellaneous fabricated textile products); and industries 399
(miscellaneous manufacturing industries) and 499 (not specified manufacturing industries). I also dropped
all the observations that are classified as: employed, unclassifiable; non-occupational response; occupation
missing/unknown; and N/A (blank).
2 3The schooling variable does make it possible to estimate high school participation across geographical
regions.
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agents and brokers; stock and bond salesmen; all service workers; all farm laborers; people
whose occupation was unclassified; people with a non-occupational response; and all people
with occupation missing/unknown or non-available. Dropping all these occupations further
reduced the sample by about 3 percent.
The only industry-level variable constructed using the IPUMS data is the complexity
measure. It is defined as one minus the Herfindahl index of occupations, excluding man-
agers, clerks and accountants and auditors. In some specifications I also use an alternative
measure of complexity, calculated using only production workers (Craftsmen, Operatives,
and Laborers not elsewhere classified).
I construct other industry-level variables using the Census of Manufactures data for
the years 1880-1909 and 1960-1990. The data for the early period includes the number of
workers and establishments, as well as the value of output and cost of various inputs for over
250 industries, as classified by Roy (1990). The more recent data is from the NBER-CES
Manufacturing Industry Database (Bartelsman et al. 2000).
The household census and the Census of Manufactures data use different classifications of
industries and the latter classification is typically much more detailed. In order to match the
data I pooled together several of the IPUMS industries: logging was merged with sawmills,
planing mills, and mill work; blast furnaces, steel works, and rolling mills was merged with
other primary iron and steel industries; yarn, thread, and fabric mills was merged with
miscellaneous textile mill products and miscellaneous fabricated textile products. Merging
these industries yielded a total of 52 industries, although a few had no observations in some
census years.
Under the IPUMS classification of occupations, all white collar workers are classified into
one of four one-digit categories: clerks, managers, professional workers and sales workers. I
constructed the category of computer personnel based on the IPUMS occupations for 1970-
2000 since no such category existed prior to 1970. In 1970 this category includes computer
and peripheral equipment operators. In 1980 and 1990 it includes supervisors, computer
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equipment operators; computer operators; and peripheral equipment operators. In 2000 it
includes computer and information systems managers; database administrators; network and
computer systems administrators; and computer operators.
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Chapter 3
The Effect of Marital Breakup on the Income
and Poverty of Women with Children
(Joint with Elizabeth 0. Ananat, MIT)
3.1 Introduction and Motivation
The poverty rate for single mothers fell substantially between 1974 and 2002. Over the same
period, the poverty rate for married mothers remained virtually unchanged. Given these
facts, one might assume that women with children are less likely to be poor than they were
30 years ago. In fact, however, the overall poverty rate for women with children rose
slightly over this period (Figure 1).
A clue to resolving this puzzle may be found in the fact that divorce and single
parenthood have been increasing dramatically over the past several decades throughout the
developed world. In the United States, the proportion of mothers who are single rose from
about 16 percent in 1974 to roughly 26 percent in 2002 (Figure 2). It appears that in the
absence of this trend, overall poverty rates would have decreased, rather than increased.
In order to establish this argument, however, one would need to demonstrate a causal
relationship between divorce and poverty. Current political discussions commonly assume
that marriage has causal beneficial effects on women and children. In particular, recent
welfare legislation encourages marriage as a method of increasing income and reducing the
need or eligibility for welfare. President Bush's 2005 budget proposal earmarks $1.2 billion
of its Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF, or welfare) budget for a five-year
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initiative "supporting healthy marriages"'; five states allocate some of their general TANF
budget to marriage promotion activities, and ten states provide cash marriage incentives in
the structure of their TANF benefits2.
Despite the assumptions made in popular debate, a causal relationship between economic
well-being and marriage preservation has not been established. Indeed, there are reasons to
suspect that the correlation between marital breakup and poverty overstates the causal effect
of divorce. For example, negative household income shocks such as job loss or falling real
wages may increase marital tension and thereby increase the likelihood of divorce, so that
poverty causes divorce rather than divorce driving poverty. In addition, women with worse
earnings opportunities may be less attractive marriage partners, which would mean that
women who get divorced have lower income, but not simply because they got divorced. Of
course, the possibility also exists that the causal relation is understated.
This paper uses an instrumental variables (IV) approach to separate the causal effects of
divorce from its well-known correlations. Using the 1980 U.S. Census, we document that
having a female first-born child slightly, but robustly, increases the probability that a
woman's first marriage breaks up. We find that the likelihood that a woman's first marriage
is broken is 0.63 percentage points higher if her first child is a girl, representing a 3.7 percent
increase from a base likelihood of 17.2 percentage points. This result, which we will argue
implies that sons have a stabilizing effect on the family unit, is consistent with the finding
(established in the psychology and sociology literature) that fathers bond more with sons.
When we use child sex as an instrumental variable to measure the effect of divorce on
economic outcomes, we find that the marital breakup driven by having a girl does not
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "FY2005 Budget in Brief."
http://www.hhs.gov/budget/05budget/acf.html
2 Gardiner, Karen, Michael Fishman, Plamen Nikolov, Asaph Glosser, and Stephanie Laud. "State Policies to
Promote Marriage: Final Report." U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Assistant Secretary for Planning
and Evaluation, 2002.
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/marriage02f/report.htm
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significantly affect mean household income. Marital breakup does, however, significantly
affect the household income distribution; in particular, it dramatically increases the
probability that a mother will end up with very low income. While child support, welfare,
and an increase in her own earnings (due to a substantially increased labor supply) go some
way towards alleviating the loss of her husband's earnings, they often do not prevent poverty
status. We also find some evidence that women who divorce may be slightly more likely to
end up at the top of the income distribution, possibly due to re-marriage.
Several concerns might reasonably be raised about causal interpretation of the
relationships between child sex, marital breakup, and economic outcomes. First, one might
be concerned that the observed relationship between child sex and divorce is in fact an
artifact of differential custody rates; women are more likely to lose custody of their boys in
divorce, leading to divorced women being observed with fewer boys. However, we find
highly comparable estimates in Current Population Survey (CPS) supplements that provide
detailed fertility histories, which lends evidence that our results are not due to bias in
observed household composition. Second, biologists (Trivers and Willard 1973) argue that
child sex is endogenous to resources-that is, that natural selection has favored the ability of
parents to have more girls in bad economic times. We find, however, that in our sample
there is no difference between the economic resources of mothers of boys and mothers of
girls when their first child is born; rather, the difference in income builds up over time, as
does the difference in divorce rates. Third, one might worry that sex of the first-born child
affects economic outcomes through channels other than divorce. For example, parents may
work harder when they have a son. But we find a negligible effect of child sex on economic
outcomes in a sample of women with a low exogenous probability of divorce, which
provides evidence that child sex is not affecting economic outcomes through a channel other
than marital breakup.
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After discussing our findings, we consider the potential macro implications of the
relationship we identify between divorce and poverty. In recent decades, mothers' poverty
rates have failed to decline as much as the overall rate. Can the increase in the proportion of
divorced women in the U.S. explain this stagnation? We calculate that, in fact, the poverty
rate of women with children today is substantially higher than it would be if divorce had not
risen over the post-1980 period.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we set our findings in the context of
previous research. In section 3, we describe the data and the sample we use. In section 4, we
describe the estimation strategy for analyzing mean outcomes and describe the results. In
section 5, we develop a framework for estimating distributional outcomes and discuss the
results. In section 6, we conclude.
3.2 Divorce and Children's Gender
Previous research has established the need for instrumental variables when examining the
effect of marital status on women's outcomes, both in theory (e.g. Becker, Landes, and
Michael 1977; Becker 1985) and empirically (e.g. Angrist and Evans 1998). In particular,
Gruber (2000) emphasizes the necessity of alternatives to cross-sectional analysis when
measuring the effect of divorce on child outcomes.
We instrument for the breakup of a woman's first marriage using the sex of the first-born
child. Having a first-born girl could be positively correlated with breakup of the first
marriage for one or more reasons involving both the husband and the wife. First, a man with
a daughter may be less interested in sustaining marriage than a man with a son. He may
intrinsically value a son more, perceiving him as an "heir." Or he may have more in
common with a boy than with a girl, and therefore bond better over time. Second, a woman
with a daughter may be less interested in sustaining marriage than a woman with a son. For
example, she may believe a son needs his father as a role model, and therefore work harder
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to retain her husband. Or she may get better companionship from a daughter, and therefore
place less weight on her relationship with her husband.
The previous literature supports the idea that fathers tend to bond more with their sons.
Aldous, Mulligan and Bjarnason (1998), using data from the U.S. National Surveys of
Families and Households, find that fathers spend more time with boys than with girls, and
that the gender gap in paternal attention increases as the child ages. This supports the idea of
increased bonding over time. Harris, Furstenberg and Marmer (1998) construct a "parental
involvement index" and find that fathers' involvement with their adolescent children is
higher with sons than with daughters, while mothers' involvement does not differ by child
sex. This supports the claim that fathers bond more with sons, but does not lend evidence
that mothers get better companionship from daughters. Thus the literature is more consistent
with the theory that fathers bond more with sons, and that this has a stabilizing effect on the
family unit.
Previous work (e.g. Angrist and Evans 1998) considers child sex as an exogenous
variable when analyzing U.S. data and after conditioning on race. This seems particularly
plausible when considering only births that took place prior to the 1980's, when ultrasound
was limited to problematic pregnancies (Campbell 2000). Nevertheless, concern has been
raised by some that child sex is endogenous to resource levels. Trivers and Willard (1973)
argue that a male is likely to out-reproduce a female if both are in good condition, and vice
versa if both are in bad condition. They argue that natural selection may therefore have
favored parental ability to adjust sex ratios so that more girls are born in bad times, and they
argue that data from mammals support their hypothesis. Our findings, however, are not
consistent with the Trivers and Willard hypothesis. We find no relationship between
economic circumstances at birth and child sex. Our findings are consistent with the
hypothesis that the sex of the eldest child is exogenous.
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Dahl and Moretti (2004), in simultaneous research, examine the relationship between
child sex and divorce-that is, our first stage. They too find a significant relationship
between having female children and divorce, although our estimates of the effect size are
smaller because we address serious selection problems that otherwise overstate the
relationship.
In related research, Bedard and Deschenes (2003) use the same instrumental variable for
divorce: gender of the first child. When we use specifications similar to theirs, our results
are generally consistent with their findings: they, like we, find that divorce has no significant
negative causal effect on women's mean economic outcomes and that the cross-sectional
relationship between divorce and household income at the mean is due to selection.
However, when we look beyond the mean to consider the way in which marital breakup
affects the entire income distribution of women with children, we arrive at a different
conclusion. Namely, we find that marital breakup has significant negative consequences for
many women; in particular, it increases the probability that a woman lives in poverty.
We also find some evidence that women who remarry may actually become "better off'
in terms of income after the end of their first marriages. This is consistent with an earlier
literature that does not attempt to establish causality or deal with selection into remarriage:
Mueller and Pope (1980) and Jacobs and Furstenberg (1986) find that women who remarry
do better in terms of their husbands' education level and SES score. Duncan and Hoffman
(1985) find that five years after their divorce, women who remarried gained in terms of
family income.3
Previous literature has not emphasized the relationship between divorce and inequality,
although both have increased substantially over the past three decades. Much of the recent
3 Both Jacobs and Furstenberg and Duncan and Hoffman argue that this is largely due to life cycle effects, so that
ifthe man these women divorced is similar to the average person in his age group, he would have made similar gains
from the time of his divorce until the time we observe the woman's second husband. We suspect, however, that in
our case the men who divorce are negatively selected, so it is plausible that women who re-married did somewhat
improve their economic situation.
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literature on the causes of inequality has focused on wage inequality and the forces that may
be affecting it, such as: technology (Acemoglu 2002); the decline of labor market institutions
(DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 1996); and the rise of international trade. Our findings
suggest that the decline of the traditional family unit as an institution may have contributed
to the rise in income inequality.
3.3 Data
We use data on women living with minor children from the 5 percent 1980 Census file,
which allow us sufficient power to identify the effect of sex of the first-born child on marital
breakup.4 We limit our sample to white women who are living with all of their children,
whose eldest child is under 17, who had their first birth after marriage, after age 18 and
before age 45, and had a single first birth. These limitations are necessary in order to create
a sample for which measurement error in the sex of the observed first-born child has a
classical structure. In particular it is important to consider only women who live with all
their children, since by doing so we avoid any spurious correlation between child sex and
household structure due to differential maternal custody rates of boys and girls. For further
discussion of the sample construction, see the Appendix.
Table 1 shows summary statistics for our full sample and subsamples relative to the
overall population of women with minor children. Our sample is quite similar to the overall
population except in terms of age and marital status. Our sample is younger than average,
consistent with the requirement that a woman's eldest child is under 17. The women in our
sample are slightly less likely to be divorced, both because they are younger and because we
require that they have custody of all children. And of course, unlike the overall population,
4 While earlier censuses have these measures, in previous decades the divorce rate was very low. Subsequent
censuses, on the other hand, don't have all of the necessary measures. We did, however, try similar specifications
using 1990 data and found similar patterns to those reported here; this finding lends evidence that cohort-specific
effects are not driving the relationship between firstborn sex and divorce.
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women in our sample cannot be never-married. On other characteristics, however, the two
groups differ little: women in our sample have slightly more education and household
income than the overall population and work and earn slightly less.
In addition to estimating our model on the full sample, we look specifically at two
subsamples that we use in specification checks: those who are at high risk of having ever
divorced and those at low risk of having ever divorced. We create an index of exogenous
risk for divorce, which is orthogonal to the sex of the eldest child (see Appendix). The high-
risk subsample includes women whose predicted risk is in the top quartile; the low-risk
subsample includes women whose predicted risk is in the bottom quartile.
The high-predicted divorce subsample is much older on average than the low-predicted
divorce subsample, consistent with more years of exposure to risk of divorce. They are also
less educated, but they have higher own and household income-probably due to lifecycle
effects.
The two subsamples allow us to test the validity of our IV strategy. As Table 1 shows,
women in the high-predicted divorce subsample are much more likely to have undergone
divorce by the time we observe them, so if the responsiveness to the child-sex instrument is
proportional to the overall level of divorce then we would expect the first stage to be bigger
for this group. Moreover, the high predicted-divorce subsample has lower years of schooling
and thus may be, on average, of lower SES; below, we conjecture that our instrument may
play a larger role in marital breakup decisions for this group. Thus we expect the first stage
to be stronger for the high-divorce subsample than for the low-divorce subsample. As a
consequence, the two-stage effect of child sex on outcomes should also be more precise for
the high-divorce subsample, if indeed our IV strategy is valid and child sex is affecting
outcomes through divorce rather than through other channels.
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3.4 The Effect of Marital Breakup on Average Economic Outcomes
3.4.1 Estimation Framework
We begin our investigation of the causal effects of divorce by considering a simple
econometric model. In this model, income is affected by the breakup of the first marriage,
which is treated as a classic endogenous regressor:
(1) D = a1Z + X 2 + Ua3 + u
(2) Y =AD + Xp2 + U3 + E
The right-hand-side variable of interest in equation (2), D, is a dummy for the breakup of
the first marriage. We define a woman as having her first marriage intact if she reported
both that she was "currently married with spouse present" and that she had been married
exactly once. We define as having her first marriage broken any woman who: has been
married multiple times, is married but currently not living with her husband, is currently
separated from her husband, is currently divorced, or is currently widowed. 5
Our outcomes, Y, are total others' income, defined as total household income less total
own income; household income; a measure of household poverty; and in some specifications
hours worked last year. The change in others' income measures the direct effect on a woman
of losing her husband as a source of income (to the extent that the husband is not replaced by
other wage earners). The change in total household income captures this direct effect but
also includes the indirect effects of divorce on income: transfers from the ex-husband in the
S We have run the analysis with ever-divorced, rather than first marriage broken, as the explanatory variable: in
this case, widows and those separated from or not living with their first husband are coded as 0 rather than 1. Our
results are not sensitive to this difference in categorization.
It is not possible to systematically remove widows from the sample, since the data do not allow us to identify
those whose first marriage ended in death among those who have had multiple marriages. In any event, since
widowhood is endogenous to both socioeconomic status and marital duration, it is probably not desirable to exclude
widows.
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form of alimony and child support6; transfers from the state in the form of cash assistance;
and income generated by the woman's own labor supply response. 7
Our controls, denoted by X, are a vector of pre-determined demographic variables
including age, age squared, age at first birth and a dummy for high-school dropouts.8 While
our Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of the relationship between marital breakup and
income may be sensitive to their inclusion, our IV specifications are robust to controls
(results without controls are available upon request). We think of U as representing
unobserved factors such as human capital, views on gender roles, and taste for non-market
work relative to market work and leisure. Finally, our instrumental variable,Z, is an
indicator for having a girl as one's firstborn child.
As discussed above, there are two major problems with estimating equation (2) with
OLS. The first, correlation of U and D, can be seen as omitted variables bias or a selection
problem, and it induces a bias of indeterminate direction. Women with worse earnings
opportunities may be less attractive marriage partners: this would imply negative selection
into marital breakup and upward bias in the estimated cost of marital breakup for women.
On the other hand, women with worse earnings opportunities may be more interested in
sustaining marriage. Or a stronger preference for household work relative to market work
may cause a woman to work harder at staying married. In this case, the women who stay
married would have supplied fewer hours of labor had their marriage broken up, and their
earnings would have been lower.
6 The 1980 Census question reads: "Unemployment compensation, veterans' payments, pensions, alimony or child
support, or any other sources of income received regularly... Exclude lump-sum payments such as money from an
inheritance or the sale of a home."
7 We have also looked at various intermediate outcomes, such as the level of alimony and child support, the level
of welfare, the woman's own earnings, and the woman's hours. All of the analyses gave results highly consistent
with the results presented here, and are available from the authors upon request.
s Since we look only at women who gave birth to their first child after age 19, we can reasonably assume that the
decision on whether to graduate from high school is made prior to the realization of the sex of the first-born child.
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The second major problem with OLS estimates of equation (2) is reverse causality.
Conditional on a woman's observed and unobserved characteristics, a negative income shock
to the household may increase marital tension and thereby raise the likelihood of divorce.
To address concerns both about omitted variable bias and about reverse causality, we
estimate equation (2) using two-stage least squares, using the sex of the eldest child (Z) as
an instrument for whether the first marriage is broken (D). Angrist and Imbens (1994) show
that in the absence of covariates and given the standard two-stage least squares assumptions, 9
the IV approach identifies the local average treatment effect:
Cov(D,Y) E[Y I Z = 1] - E[Y I Z = 0] O] = E[Y - D >D]
,IV Var(D) E[DIZ = 1]- E[DIZ = 0]
Here Y and Y denote the income (or other dependent variable) for women whose first
marriage is broken and intact, respectively. Di is an indicator for whether a woman would
divorce if her first child were a girl; Do is an indicator for whether she would divorce if her
first child were a boy. D and Do are, of course, just hypothetical constructs; in practice we
can only observe the indicator for the child sex that is realized.
Plv therefore measures the change in income due to divorce for women whose first
marriage breaks up if they have a girl and remains intact if they have a boy. That is, two-
stage least squares estimates the average effect of divorce only for that part of the population
for whom the treatment is equal to the instrument (D >Do), the group known as
"compliers." As one might imagine, this group is typically not a random subsample of the
9 The assumptions are: conditional independence of Z , exclusion of the instrument, existence of a first stage and
monotonicity - see Abadie (2002). The result can be generalized for the case with covariates.
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population, and in fact we will show below that those who comply with sex of the first-born
child tend to be of low socio-economic status (SES). 10
3.4.2 First Stage Results: Child Sex and Marital Breakup
The first stage results for the entire population as well as for the full sample and various
subsamples are presented in Table 2. When equation (1) is estimated for all women living
with minor children, the coefficient on child sex is 1.13 percent. We believe that this figure
overstates the actual effect of child sex on marital breakup, because endogeneity in the sex of
the eldest child residing with a woman will create a spurious correlation between living with
an eldest girl and being divorced. l l That is, since women are more likely to end up with
custody of girls than boys in the event of divorce, living with a girl is cross-sectionally
correlated with being divorced above and beyond the causal effect of having a girl on marital
breakup.
The second column gives the estimated relationship for our sample, which is constructed
in order to close the custody channel, so that the relationship between child sex and marital
breakup is causal. We find that the average effect of the first child being a girl on the
breakup of the first marriage is about 0.63 percent, which is substantially smaller than the
full-population estimate, but still highly significant. Furthermore, as discussed below, we
replicate our result using data from the Current Population Survey, which identifies the sex
n0 Note that fliv can only be interpreted as the causal effect of divorce for the average complier to the extent that
the sample is not contaminated with "defiers". Defiers are women for whom D o > D l , that is, women whose first
marriage would dissolve only if their firstborn is a boy. We have run first-stage regressions for a variety of sub-
populations and found no significant sign reversals in the coefficient of child sex on divorce, suggesting that defiers,
if any, are a very small group.
" In fact, a regression similar to those in Table 2 for a sample of women with all of our restrictions except that she
must reside with all of her children gives an estimate of .010. This result is much closer to the estimate in column 1
than in column 2, suggesting that the factor driving the difference between the estimates in the full population and in
our sample is the endogeneity of child residence.
118
of a woman's actual firstborn child (and hence requires no sample restrictions). The CPS
results are highly similar to those from our Census sample.
The effect increases with the age of the eldest child, suggesting, sensibly, that the sex of
the first child affects the hazard rate of divorce and separation.' 2 This can also be seen in
Figures 3 and 4, each presenting the results from 17 separate regressions by the age (0 to 16)
of the eldest child. We also find that the effect size varies by the woman's education-high-
school dropouts exhibit the strongest effect, and the effect size diminishes as education
increases. This suggests that our instrument primarily provides us insight on the effects of
marital breakup particularly for low-SES women.
Finally, we find a larger and more significant effect on those at higher exogenous risk of
divorce: the quarter of our sample with the highest predicted risk of divorce has a first stage
of 1.13 percent (highly significant), and the group that is least likely to divorce has a first
stage of 0.36 percent (marginally significant). The differential effect by underlying
probability of divorce lends evidence that the instrument is acting in the way we would
anticipate.
One further implication of the figures should also be noted: a comparison between
Figures 3 and 4 reveals that the effects of sex of the eldest child on the breakup of the first
marriage are bigger than those on being currently divorced. Much of this difference comes
from the fact that some of the women who divorced due to the instrument have since
remarried. In addition, some of those who have not re-married have instead moved in with
other adults (such as their parents). We find that having an eldest girl increases the
probability that a woman is the head of household by only about half as much as the increase
in probability that her first marriage is broken (result not shown). 13 It is therefore important
12 The base hazard rate of divorce may also change with the length of the relationship, which is correlated with the
age of the eldest child.
13 Note that this will not capture all avenues of combining households, since a woman may share a household and
be identified as its head.
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to keep in mind that we are not estimating the effect of being currently divorced or of
residing in a mother-only household on economic outcomes. Rather, we are estimating the
effect of having ever been divorced on current outcomes.
3.4.3 Specification Checks
While the lack of over-identification implies that we cannot formally test the validity of
our instrument, we do bring to bear some evidence that the instrument is not correlated with
other omitted variables. First, we test the Trivers and Willard hypothesis that adverse
conditions cause women to give birth to a higher proportion of girls. We have examined the
income of mothers who were never married, and found that the income distribution in this
group was very similar whether the eldest was a girl or a boy. We have also examined the
income of women who were married when their first child was born and whose first marriage
was still intact, and similarly found that the income distribution in this group was virtually
the same whether the eldest was a girl or a boy. (Results not shown.)
This is still not a conclusive refutation of the endogenous sex hypothesis for our sample:
the first group, those who were never married, are not included in our sample (we limit to
those whose first birth occurred after their first marriage); the second group includes women
who remain married after having a girl (i.e. those who do not respond to our instrument, and
thus for whom we cannot measure the causal effect of divorce). But we have also found that
the reduced-form effect of the instrument on household income and on others' income is
small and statistically insignificant shortly after the child is born. Rather, the effect of the
instrument increases with time.14 This suggests that child sex is not the result of resources,
but rather that later resources are the result of child sex, through its effect on marital
breakup-note that the effect of sex on breakup similarly builds over time (see Figures 3 and
4).
14 We also regressed the sex of the eldest child on household income and controls for mothers whose children
were aged 0-1 and found no significant effect of household income on child sex.
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If child sex is not the result of resources, we can interpret as causal the reduced-form
relationship between having an eldest girl and economic outcomes. But child sex may affect
outcomes through paths other than divorce, so that our IV estimate of the effect of divorce on
outcomes is misstated. There are various possible reasons why either or both parents might
work more or less in response to the sex of the eldest child.1 5 We again cannot refute these
possibilities directly. However, when we looked at the sample of women whose marriages
remain intact, the income distribution and labor supply of mothers did not substantially differ
by the sex of the eldest child. Similarly, if child sex affects economic outcomes through
channels other than marital breakup, we would expect differences in outcomes by firstborn
sex for the group that is predicted to have a low divorce rate. But we do not find any
significant effects for this subsample.
We might also overestimate the cost of divorce if fathers pay differential child support by
the sex of the eldest child. It is possible that fathers of boys transfer more money to the
mother of their child, even if they are no longer married to her. In this case, again, having a
girl would be negatively correlated with women's outcomes, but not solely through marital
breakup. To check this possibility, we examined the Census "other income" variable (which
includes child support and alimony) for women who are currently divorced and for women
who are ever divorced. We found that other income did not differ by the sex of the eldest
child (results not shown).1 6
'5 For example, parents may work harder in the labor market when they have a boy. Lundberg and Rose (2002)
find that men's labor supply and wage rates increase more in response to the births of sons than to the births of
daughters. In addition, having a girl may, even in the absence of divorce, cause increased marital conflict, which
could in turn negatively impact economic outcomes. In either case, having a girl would be negatively correlated
with women's outcomes, but not solely through marital breakup, and using it as an instrument would cause an
overstatement of the cost of divorce. Alternatively, women may increase their labor supply as a "defensive
investment" in anticipation that their marriage may be less stable (Weiss 1997) if their first child is a girl.
16 Dahl and Moretti (2003) find that divorced mothers of multiple children who are all girls are marginally
significantly less likely to receive child support than those whose children are all boys. They, however, use a much
less restricted sample, and use the gender of all children. Even within their sample and methodology, when they
examine all family sizes they do not find a significant effect.
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A final caveat remains for using the sex of the eldest child as an instrument for marital
breakup: having a son as one's eldest child may affect the likelihood of re-marriage after the
first marriage was broken. Note, again, that this would not invalidate the causal
interpretation of the reduced-form estimates, but could cause us to overstate the direct effects
of divorce. Again, we cannot rule out the existence of such a causal effect. However, when
we regress a dummy for being currently married on having an eldest girl for ever-divorced
women in our sample, the coefficient is indeed negative, but is not statistically significant (t-
statistic=0.67).
As an additional check on the validity of the relationship between child sex and marital
breakup, we replicate our Census estimates using CPS data. We do so to address potential
concern about the reliability of our Census sample-that despite our best effort to restrict our
sample to women for whom error in observed eldest child sex is uncorrelated with marital
status, some error remains and is contaminating our estimate. We address this concern by
using CPS fertility supplements. Because they record a woman's fertility history regardless
of whether her children are still in the household, we do not have to worry about bias in the
sex of the children still in the household.
Four June CPS supplements (1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995) record the sex of a woman's
first-born child. In this sample, we need only restrict to women who are white, had their first
birth after their first marriage, and had a single first birth-we need not make any of the
Census restrictions that were geared towards assuring that we accurately observe the sex of
the first child. 17 When we pool these supplements (N=107,519), we again find that having an
eldest girl significantly increases the probability of marital breakup. In fact, we find that
'7 Compared to the census data, the CPS has drawbacks as well as advantages. On the one hand, the CPS allows
us to look at older women, whose eldest children left their house after their full impact on marital stability had been
realized, thus increasing the potential causal effect. On the other hand, older women are less likely to have
experienced divorce (due to cohort effects) and widowhood may be higher, attenuating the estimated effect of child
sex on marital breakup. Finally, in order to get a large enough sample, we needed to look at more recent data, since
the CPS recorded women's fertility history only in the four samples we used.
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having an eldest girl causes a 0.68 percent increase in the probability that the first marriage
breaks up (t-statistic=2.31). We consider the similarity of the point estimates from both
samples (the Census estimate is 0.63 percent) an encouraging sign that our results reflect a
real and significant effect of the sex of the first child on the probability of marital breakup.
3.4.4 The Effect of Marital Breakup on Mean Outcomes
Cross-sectional (OLS) regressions of income and labor supply on marital breakup (Table
3), which admit no causal interpretation, show that breakup of the first marriage is correlated
with large losses in income and large increases in labor supply. Both of these relationships
confirm the conventional view that women whose first marriages end are significantly worse
off than women whose first marriages remain intact.
Two-stage least squares estimates, on the other hand, suggest that the mean effect of
marital breakup on material well-being is quite different from the cross-sectional results.
The two-stage estimate of the effect of divorce on others' income is negative but
insignificant, though still within two standard deviations of the OLS estimates, as is the two-
stage estimate for log household income.
The two-stage estimate of the effect of divorce on household income level, however, is
significantly more positive than the OLS estimate-while the coefficient is not statistically
different from zero, it is more than two standard deviations from the negative OLS estimate.
The same is true for the high predicted-divorce subsample. For the low predicted-divorce
subsample our first stage is barely significant, so the two-stage least squares estimate cannot
rule out zero effect or an effect equal to the cross-sectional effect. (The absence of
significant estimates for the low predicted divorce subsample in all of our IV specifications
is consistent with the fact that the first stage is only marginally significant for this group,
supporting our hypothesis that child sex affects outcomes only through divorce).
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Taken together, these results imply that on average there is negative selection into
divorce-women who would have had low income anyway are more likely to divorce,
creating a negative cross-sectional correlation between income and divorce-and that there is
no significant causal effect of divorce on mean income. The lack of significant effect on
others' income is probably due to the fact that most women compensate for the loss of their
husbands' income by re-marriage or by moving in with other adults. Moreover, we find a
very large increase in mean hours worked (about 1,000 hours a year), which is more than
double the cross-sectional effect and clearly helps offset the loss of husband income in the
measure of household income. 8
As the labor supply results indicate, the stability of mean income should not be taken to
imply that there is no mean welfare loss from divorce. The increase in work without a
significant increase in income could imply a welfare loss for women, since they experience a
mean decrease in leisure without an expansion of consumption possibilities. In addition, it
may imply adverse consequences for children; for example, if parents are not perfectly
altruistic they may divorce even if doing so disrupts joint household production, including
childrearing. Our results indicate that on average children receive no gain in consumption
but likely experience a decrease in time with their mother (and probably with their father as
well).
3.5 The Effect of Marital Breakup on the Income Distribution
3.5.1 Estimation Framework
The difference in sign between the IV estimates of the effect of divorce on mean log
income and on mean level of income leads us to investigate the possibility that there are
important effects of marital breakup on the income distribution, particularly at the bottom,
i8 Our results thus far are broadly consistent with those of Bedard and Deschenes (2003), despite our use of
different sample restrictions and specifications, lending further evidence of the robustness of the relationships we
analyze.
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that aren't evident at the mean. In fact, it makes intuitive sense that the effect of divorce on
the income distribution would be to fatten the lower tail, rather than to shift the entire
distribution uniformly downward. After all, divorce-and the implied withdrawal of the
husband's income-represents a discrete fall in income. To the extent that women remarry,
move in with other relatives, or have high earning potential, many may end up as well off
financially as before (or even better off)-resulting in little effect of divorce on the mean of
the distribution. And yet a subset of women who cannot recover from the loss would
experience a much greater than average effect of divorce, falling near the bottom of the
distribution.
To address this possibility, we consider more flexible specifications in which we estimate
the effect of marital breakup on the probability that a woman's income is below various
thresholds. This enables us to identify the marginal effect of marital breakup on the
cumulative distribution function (CDF). In addition, we obtain estimators of the CDF itself
for those whose first marriage is broken and for those whose first marriage is intact. Doing
so allows us to evaluate the magnitude of the effect of divorce on the income distribution.
Recall that the local average treatment effect formula in equation (3) gave the causal
effect of treatment on the compliers. Similarly, Abadie (2002, 2003) demonstrates that in
absence of covariates and with the same assumptions as the standard two-stage least squares
model:' 9
(4) E[Y I D > Do] = E[(1 - D)Y I Z = 1] - E[(1 - D)Y I Z = 0]
E[- D) Z = 1 - E[(1- D) I Z = 0]
19 Proof of equation (4): Z = i :> D = Dz = Y = Yz for i = 0,1, so the numerator is:
E[(1 - D)Y I Z = 1] - E[(1 - D)Y I Z = 0] = E[(1 - D, )Y, - (1 - Do)Y o]
By the monotonicity assumption this equals:
E[(1-D)Y, -(1-Do)Yo D > D]P[DI >Do]=E[Yo ID, > D]P[DI >Do ]
Dividing by the denominator yields: E[Y o I D I > D ].
Since X is discrete, this proof can be extended to the case where we add controls.
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We can similarly estimate the following equation using two-stage least squares with
controls, using the sex of the eldest child as an instrument:
(5) (1- D)Y = y(l - D) + XS +,u
This strategy gives a consistent estimator:
(6) Y,v - y = E[Yo X; D > Do]
That is, y gives the expected value of Y for compliers who have a boy (and whose
marriage therefore remains intact). When we apply this method to the case where Y is the
CDF of the income distribution we can effectively trace out the CDF for compliers who have
boys. Similarly, we could estimate the CDF for compliers who have girls.2 0 But a standard
two-stage least squares estimate of the effect of marital breakup on an indicator for a given
income level gives the difference between the two CDFs. Thus, by summing the standard
coefficient and the estimate of equation (6), we can likewise trace out the CDF for compliers
who have girls. Finally, we also estimate equation (6) using OLS, and compare it to the
instrumental variables estimate.
3.5.2 The Effect of Marital Breakup on the Distribution of Outcomes
In each of Tables 4, 5, and 6, the columns of results labeled "First marriage intact" report
the CDF for those who remain married, estimated using the method described above. (Recall
that in the two-stage least squares regressions, the CDFs are estimated for the specific group
of women-"compliers"-who divorce or stay married in response to the sex of the first-
born child.) The columns labeled "Difference in CDFs: broken - intact" report the estimated
difference in CDFs between the compliers who have divorced and those who stay married,
which is the standard coefficient on breakup in the OLS or two-stage least squares
estimation.
20 By estimating the equation: DY = D + Xp + q we can get v --> 0 = E[Y I X;DI > Do]. The proof
is similar.
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OLS estimates of the difference in distribution of income by marital breakup (first two
columns in Tables 4 and 5) tell a familiar story. In cross-section, those with broken first
marriages have income distributions -both household and others'- that are first-order
stochastically dominated by those of women with intact first marriages. That is, divorce is
correlated with a uniform shift downward in income at every point in the income
distribution. 2 1
The two-stage least squares estimates in Tables 4 and 5 give a more nuanced picture.2 2
We do in fact find a large effect of marital breakup on the probability of being at the bottom
of the income distribution: women whose first marriage is broken are 42 percentage points
more likely (about twelve times as likely) to have less than $5000 in others' income, and 23
percentage points more likely (about 80 percent more likely) to have less than $10,000.
While legal transfers (which include child support and mean-tested transfers) reduce the
number of compliers with no income, over a quarter of the divorced compliers have no
unearned income even after accounting for transfers-compared to virtually none of the
compliers who stay married (results not shown).
The analysis of household income similarly shows a large effect of marital breakup on
the density at the bottom of the income distribution. Roughly one in six of those who
experience marital breakup have less than $5000 in household income, compared to virtually
none of those who remain married.23 Results follow a similar pattern for the high predicted-
21 Note also that the estimated income distribution for compliers whose first marriage remains intact is first-order
stochastically dominated by the income distribution for the full sample. This result, which holds throughout Tables
4-6, is consistent with the view that the people who respond to the instrument are typically of relatively low SES.
22 Note that the estimation of linear probability models results in some estimates that are slightly outside the [0,1]
interval, though always well within two standard errors of this interval. Despite this drawback, we prefer to follow
this methodology because of its transparency.
23 Although they cannot earn enough to make up for the loss in others' income, divorced compliers do have a very
large labor supply response to the loss. Since the distributional effect on hours does not differ markedly from the
mean responsiveness, a separate analysis is not included here.
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divorce subsample, as expected. For the low predicted-divorce subsample, the effects are not
significant and do not demonstrate any consistent pattern, also as expected.
Interestingly, the two-stage estimates also show that those who divorce due to the
instrument (in both the full sample and the high predicted-divorce subsample) are somewhat
more likely to have income near the top of the distribution, although the differences are not
statistically significant. The reversal in the sign of the difference occurs at (in the case of
others' income) or below (in the case of household income) the mean of the distribution,
explaining why models for the mean find little effect of marital breakup on income. Previous
literature (e.g. Mueller and Pope 1980, Jacobs and Furstenberg 1986) finds that when
divorced women remarry, their second husband is typically more educated and has a higher
occupational SES score (although at least some of this is due to life-cycle effects). In
addition, Bedard and Deschenes (2003) argue that many divorced mothers co-reside with
their parents, who likely have higher joint incomes than their husbands. The reversal in sign
is more substantial for total household income than for others' income, probably because that
also includes top-end variation in women's earnings as well as sources of other income (such
as alimony and child support).
The results discussed thus far ignore one important aspect of divorce-namely, it reduces
family size. Thus even though income decreases at the bottom with divorce, women may not
necessarily end up worse off; on the other hand, if income gains at the top come primarily
through remarriage, the effect may be neutralized by increased family size. To estimate the
effect of divorce on the ratio of income to needs, we divide each woman's total household
income by the poverty line for a household of that size.
As shown in Table 6, we find that changes in family size do not mitigate our results. The
OLS estimates still indicate that marital breakup decreases normalized household income at
all levels. The two-stage least squares results indicate that virtually none of those still in their
first marriage have household income below the poverty line, while nearly a quarter of those
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whose first marriage ended are below poverty. Compliers whose first marriage ended are,
however, significantly more likely to be above 400 percent of poverty than are compliers
whose first marriage remains intact. The results for the high-predicted divorce subsample are
similar - divorce significantly increases the probability of poverty and the effect reverses at
the top of the distribution, although the effect is not significant for the subsample. As
always, the low-poverty subsample shows no significant effect and no discernable pattern,
consistent with our hypothesis.
3.6 Discussion
Our results suggest that negative selection into divorce accounts for the observed
relationship between marital breakup and lower mean income. Yet marital breakup does
have a significant causal effect on the distribution of income: divorce increases the percent of
women at the bottom-and perhaps at the top-tail of the income distribution. In net,
divorce causally increases poverty, and perhaps inequality more generally, for women with
children.
What would have been the poverty rate of women with children in 1995 had the fraction
of ever-divorced mothers not changed since 1980? In 1995 (the most recent year for which
we have data on marital history, from the CPS), the poverty rate for women with our sample
characteristics who are still in their first marriage was 8.7 percent, while the rate for women
who have ever divorced was 21.7 percent. Thus if divorce had stayed at its 1980 prevalence
(17.2 percent ever divorced), the overall poverty rate in this sample would be:
Counterfactual poverty rate = (% ever divorced 1980)*(poverty rate I ever divorced 1995)
+ (% never divorced 1980)*(poverty rate I never divorced 1995)
= 0.172*0.217 + (1-0.172)*0.087 = 0.109,
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or 10.9 percent. Because the prevalence of divorce rose to 28.6 percent, the poverty rate
became:
Actual poverty rate = (% ever divorced 1995)*(poverty rate I ever divorced 1995)
+ (% never divorced 1995)*(poverty rate I never divorced 1995)
= 0.286*0.217 + (1-0.286)*0.087 = 0.124,
or 12.4 percent. Thus the increase in divorce may potentially have caused an increase of
1.5 points, or 13.8 percent, in the poverty rate for women with our sample characteristics. If
we assume that the effect holds outside of those with our sample characteristics, we can
conclude that nearly 1.4 million more women and children were in poverty in 1995 than
would have been if the divorce rate had remained at its 1980 level.
We conclude by noting that our findings do not have clear-cut policy implications. While
some might interpret them as evidence for the importance of traditional family structures,
others may conclude that they emphasize the need for more generous welfare policies.
3.7 Data Appendix
The 5 percent 1980 Census data contain several measures that allow us to analyze a
woman's fertility history. These include the number of children ever born to a woman, the
number of marriages, the quarter as well as year of first birth, and the quarter and year of
first marriage. This information permits us to identify the sex of the first-born child for most
women, although not for women whose eldest child has left the household.
A substantial drawback of using cross-sectional data is the fact that we can only observe
the sex of the eldest child residing with a woman, whereas our true characteristic of interest
is the sex of the firstborn child. It is imperative that we create a sample of women for whom
measurement error in the sex of the observed first-born child has a classical structure.
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To that end, we attempt to restrict the sample to those women observed with all their
biological children. We do so in order to limit the risk that our results will be affected by
differential attrition of boys and girls. In particular, we are concerned that boys may be
differentially likely to end up in the custody of their fathers in the event of marital breakup.
In fact, as Table A, panel 1, shows, girls are significantly less likely than boys to be living
with their father and not their mother. This pattern could lead to endogeneity of our
instrument if the sample were left uncorrected. If, in the event of divorce, fathers keep the
sons and mothers keep the daughters, there will be a spurious positive correlation in the
overall sample between marital breakup and the eldest observed child being a girl.
To address this issue, we exclude any woman for whom the number of children ever born
does not equal the number of children living with her. If a mother lives with stepchildren or
adopted children in a number that exactly offsets the number of her own children that are not
living with her, this rule will fail to exclude her. We therefore further minimize the
possibility of including women who have non-biological children "standing in" for biological
children by including only women whose age at first birth is measured as between 19 and 44.
Limiting our sample to women who are living with all of their children reduces but does
not eliminate the threat that differential custody rates could bias our result-because we
could still be more likely to include divorced women with two girls than those with one boy
and one girl or those with two boys. We find, however, that mothers living with all their
children and mothers in the overall population are equally likely to be observed with a girl as
the eldest child, which suggests that sex of the eldest child is not a major determinant of
living with all of one's children (See Table A, panel 2).
Second, we limit our sample to women whose first child was born after their first
marriage, since breakup of the first marriage is our focus. If instead we included out-of-
wedlock births, we would be concerned that the sex of the first child affected selection into
the first marriage. To the extent that people could learn the sex of the child before it was
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born and thereby select into "shotgun marriages," we may still have selection into first
marriage. But ultrasound technology was not yet widely used in 1980 (Campbell 2000), so
this threat is not of particular concern. In addition, because we can only identify the
beginning of the first marriage and not the end, we may include some women whose first
child was born after the breakup of the first marriage. But this should create only classical
measurement error in our first stage estimation.
Third, we look only at mothers whose eldest child is a minor, since those who still live
with their adult children may be a select group. Further, since girls are differentially likely
to leave home early (at ages 17 and 18), we restrict to mothers whose eldest child is under
age 17. Fourth, we limit our sample to white women because black women's childbearing
and marital decisions may be quite different, and fully modeling the differences would
greatly complicate the analysis. Finally, we leave out women whose first child was a twin,
both because different-sex twins would complicate our instrument and because twins
increase the number of children a woman has.
Selection into our restricted sample might be cause for concern, just as selection into the
labor market is cause for concern when measuring labor outcomes. To test for such a
problem, we generated the predicted probability that a woman was included in our sample
based on age and birthplace dummies. Then we re-ran our two-stage estimates, treating a
woman's predicted probability of inclusion as an endogenous regressor. Our first- and
second-stage estimates were quite stable with and without this variable.
To create our high- and low-predicted divorce subsamples, we create an exogenous risk
index (Table A, panel 3) by predicting "ever divorced" using age, age squared, age at first
birth, and dummies for place of birth and for high school dropout (recall that our sample
includes only women whose first birth occurs after age 19, so the decision on whether to
graduate from high school can be treated as pre-determined).
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In summary, the limitations we place on the sample are designed to create a group of
women for whom we can measure the sex of the firstborn child with only classical
measurement error. These restrictions weaken the power of our first stage, but we believe
this compromise is necessary in order to minimize concerns about endogeneity of our
instrument.
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Table A. Specification Checks and Sample Construction
Panel I Dependent variable: Child is a girl
Child lives with father and not with mother -0.0501
(0.0022)
Constant 0.4888
(0.0003)
Observations 2,810,256
Panel 2 Dependent variable: Eldest child is a girl
Mother lives with all her children 0.0000
(0.0013)
Constant 0.4871
(0.0011)
Observations 790,746
Panel 3 Dependent variable: Ever divorced
Age 0.0264
(0.0003)
Age squared 100 -0.0305
(0.0005)
Age at first birth -0.0025
(0.0001)
Dummy for high school dropout 0.0947
(0.0012)
Observations 1,092,433
NOTES: The sample in panel 1 includes white children under age 19 (the unit of observation is a child)
The sample in panel 2 includes women meeting the set of restrictions imposed throughout the paper, except that we
do not restrict to mothers living with all their children. That is, it includes white mothers who had their first birth
after marriage after age 18 and before age 45, had a single first birth, and whose eldest child is under 17.
The sample in panel 3 includes white women who had their first birth after marriage, after age 18, and before age
45, and had a single first birth. Controls also include birthplace dummies (147 categories)
Robust standard errors in brackets
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